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Our ability to form expectations about future events or the results of our own actions is 
crucial for efficient behavior. While this notion underlies a range of influential theoretical 
approaches in cognitive psychology, from reinforcement learning to ideo-motor theory, a 
number of open questions remain. Recent results from neurophysiological and brain imaging 
studies suggest that conscious intention – or explicit expectation – is nothing more than a by-
product of automatic and unconscious activation patterns, without any real impact on 
behavior. Explicit subjective expectation has been dismissed by many researchers who regard 
it either an unreliable measure of “true” mental processes, or question its necessity in 
explaining behavior in general. 
 In the current work, I focus on the role of explicit subjective expectation and attempt to 
answer the following questions: (1) Are verbalized predictions a valid indicator of internally 
generated expectations? (2) Do such expectations really affect action preparation? (3) What 
are the differences between expectations arising from external or internal sources? Results 
from the three studies conducted within the scope of this dissertation demonstrate that 
verbalized predictions are in fact a valid indicator of subjective expectation and are suitable 
for use in experimental paradigms. Also, subjective expectation cannot be described as a 
mere by-product of preparation, but instead feeds into preparation and therefore plays a role 
in action control. Self-generated expectation was shown to involve early attentional and 
central decision processes to a greater degree than cue-induced expectation. Consequently, 
self-generated predictions entailed greater behavioral effects not only for stimulus 
expectations, but also for expectations regarding a task set. Subjective expectation is 





Unsere Fähigkeit Erwartungen auszubilden über zukünftige Ereignisse oder die 
Ergebnisse unserer eigenen Handlungen ist von entscheidender Bedeutung für zielgerichtetes 
Verhalten. Obgleich diese Ansicht einer Reihe von einflussreichen theoretischen Strömungen 
in der kognitiven Psychologie zugrunde liegt, bleiben bislang wichtige Fragen dazu offen. 
Jüngere Ergebnisse aus neurophysiologischen und Bildgebungsstudien legen nahe, dass 
bewusste Ziele – ähnlich expliziter Erwartung – nicht mehr sind als ein Nebenprodukt von 
automatischen und unbewussten Aktivierungsmustern und keinen echten Einfluss auf 
Verhalten haben. Explizite subjektive Erwartung wird vielmals abgetan, weil sie kein 
zuverlässiges Maß „wahrer“ mentaler Prozesse darstelle, oder weil sie nicht notwendig sei, 
um Verhalten zu erklären. 
In der vorliegenden Arbeit beschäftige ich mich mit der Rolle expliziter subjektiver 
Erwartung und untersuche die folgenden Fragen: (1) Sind verbalisierte Vorhersagen ein 
valider Indikator für intern generierte Erwartungen? (2) Haben solche Erwartungen 
tatsächlich einen Einfluss auf Handlungsvorbereitung? (3) Worin besteht der Unterschied 
zwischen Erwartungen, die auf äußeren oder inneren Quellen beruhen? Die Ergebnisse aus 
drei Studien, die ich im Rahmen dieser Dissertation durchgeführt habe, belegen, dass 
verbalisierte Vorhersagen ein valider Indikator von subjektiver Erwartung sind. Subjektive 
Erwartung kann nicht als ein Nebenprodukt von Handlungsvorbereitung verstanden werden, 
sondern trägt zu dieser bei und spielt daher eine wichtige Rolle in der Handlungskontrolle. 
Selbstgenerierte Erwartung beeinflusst gegenüber Cue-induzierter Erwartung verstärkt frühe 
Aufmerksamkeits- und zentrale Entscheidungsprozesse. Selbstgenerierte Vorhersagen führen 
zu verstärkten Verhaltenseffekten, und zwar sowohl bei Stimuluserwartungen als auch bei 
Erwartungen bezüglich einer Aufgabe. Subjektive Erwartung ist demnach auch entscheidend 
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In a soccer match, a goalkeeper facing a penalty kick will usually start moving before 
the ball is actually played to increase the chances of saving it within the approximate 500 
milliseconds it takes to reach the goal line (St. John, 2010). In order to decide which way to 
dive, the goalkeeper has to have an expectation regarding the direction in which the shot will 
go. This can be unconscious, for example, the tendency to move to the right under pressure 
(Roskes et al., 2011). The goalkeeper may also rely on her knowledge of the shooter’s past 
behavior, or may try to read the shooter’s motion pattern. The more accurate the goalkeeper’s 
expectation, the higher the chances of beating the odds that favor the shooter at a success rate 
between 75% and 85% (Bar-Eli & Azar, 2009). 
The focus of this work is the role of expectation in action control. Our ability to form 
expectations about future events or the results of our own actions is crucial for efficient 
behavior. In the history of psychology, there have been various theoretical approaches 
emphasizing the importance of expectation in controlling action and learning. In the 
following paragraphs, I will briefly sketch these broad ideas before outlining the research 
questions addressed in this work. 
The concept that having the idea of an action can translate into the execution of that 
action was already discussed by William James (1890, p. 492f.): “[...] in perfectly simple 
voluntary acts there is nothing else, in the mind but the kinœsthetic idea, thus defined, of 
what the act is to be.” This concept was dubbed the ideo-motor principle, but due to its 
origins in introspective reasoning it was largely neglected after the advent of behaviorist 
experimental psychology, in which actions were viewed as more or less simple responses 
controlled by a stimulus (e.g., Thorndike, 1905). To this day, experiments in cognitive 
psychology often center around manipulating some kind of audio-visual stimulation and 




However, voluntary actions have received renewed interest with the recent focus on 
executive functions. Modern theories of action control have revived the ideo-motor principle 
(e.g., Hommel et al., 2001), stating that “acting without anticipating is impossible” (Kunde, 
Elsner & Kiesel, 2007, p. 76). 
In a different vein, since Ivan Pavlov carried out his first experiments in conditioning in 
1901, the concept of associative reinforcement learning has become one of the central ideas 
in psychology. According to this view, learning consists of the strengthening of associations 
between stimuli and responses (S-R; Pavlov, 1927). Challenging this view, Tolman (1948) 
argued that participants in a learning experiment instead acquired expectancies containing 
predictive relationships between environmental events. Since then, expectancies have become 
a key part in most modern learning theories (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Learning takes 
place when an actual outcome differs from an expected one. This discrepancy is commonly 
called the prediction error, and it is used to update the expectation to more closely resemble 
environmental probabilities. Such prediction errors have been found to be encoded in 
dopaminergic activity of midbrain neurons (Schultz et al., 1997). The detection of unexpected 
events is also thought to trigger strategy optimization (Frensch et al., 2003). 
There is an abundance of theoretical accounts and empirical data suggesting that our 
cognitive system needs to constantly generate predictions to be able to learn and to act (see 
Bar, 2011, for a recent overview). Without an expectation, the goalkeeper from our example 
would not be able to initiate a movement in time. The anticipation of where the ball will go 
and of how she will save it allows her to take the according action. And if she gets it wrong, 
the disconfirmed expectation will feed into her accumulated experience and enable her to 






2. Research questions 
Learning and action rely on expectations continuously generated by our cognitive 
system. To measure internally generated subjective expectation, it is inevitable to employ 
some sort of self-report. This in turn builds on the assumption that such verbal reports are 
based on direct introspective access to mental processes, an assumption that has been fiercely 
challenged (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Researchers have suggested that conscious 
intention might be nothing more than an epiphenomenon of preparatory processes in the brain 
(e.g., Libet et al., 1983). When asking participants for their subjective expectation, they might 
simply reflect a preparatory state that is not in turn influenced by that expectation. The first 
aim of this work is therefore to evaluate if verbalized predictions are a valid indicator of 
internally generated expectations, and if such expectations really affect action preparation. 
Because subjective expectation is difficult to assess objectively in an experimental 
setting, or because they mistrust its validity on principle, researchers interested in effects of 
expectation often resort to the use of external stimulation to induce expectation 
experimentally (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975). While allowing for a more controlled 
environment, this approach compromises the core idea of expectation being generated by 
ourselves. Expectations inserted from the outside by artificial laboratory manipulations such 
as cueing procedures might have similar properties and effects as self-generated expectations, 
but this assumption has hardly been tested in psychological research so far. The second aim 
of this work is therefore to analyze possible differences between expectations arising from 
external or internal sources. 
This thesis consists of three studies that were conducted to address questions left open 
by previous empirical and theoretical work on the effects and underlying mechanisms of 
subjective expectation: (1.a) Is subjective expectation more than a byproduct of preparatory 




indicator of subjective expectation, i.e. do they conform to other behavioral measures? (2.a) 
Is self-generated subjective expectation different from externally induced expectation in 
regard to its impact on preparation? (2.b) Which cognitive processes are differentially 
influenced by self-generated and cue-induced expectation? (3.a) Does subjective expectation 
allow for preparation beyond simple stimulus-response connections, e.g. on the more abstract 
level of task sets? (3.b) Can subjective expectation enable preparation for cognitive conflict, 
and reduce its detrimental impact on performance? 
3. Overview of studies 
In the following pages, I will provide an overview of the studies conducted within the 
scope of this thesis and discuss the results in relation to the questions formulated above. I will 
draw connections to the relevant literature and place my own research within a larger context. 
Finally, I will draw conclusions regarding the overarching question about the role of 
expectation and argue for the use of explicit subjective measures in this field of research. 
3.1. Study I: Does explicit expectation really affect preparation? (Umbach et al., 
2012) 
The first study was conducted to answer the question whether explicit expectation is 
more than a by-product of action preparation. Intuitively, we might take for granted the 
notion that expectation affects preparation. But this notion has been challenged by findings 
showing that explicit intentions to act only emerge several seconds after the according 
preparatory processes are initiated in the brain (Soon et al., 2008). What introspectively 
seems to drive our actions might be nothing more than an epiphenomenon of unconscious 
processes determined by our brain long before, according to this line of reasoning.  
To test whether explicit expectation can actually affect our actions, it is necessary to 
separate it from preparation. In this study, we manipulated expectation by varying stimulus 




on the finding that expectations often originate from our experience: we expect events 
occurring with a high frequency in the past to be more likely to occur again in the future. 
Event frequency is also known to influence performance: responses to a more common event 
are usually quicker than to a rare event. In this way, expectation and performance often go 
along with each other. Possible causal relations between them are therefore difficult to assess.  
With this goal in mind, we developed an experimental paradigm in which participants 
were led to expect one type of event (the most frequent stimulus), while an additional task 
demand required them to prepare for a different event (the less frequent stimulus). This 
additional task demand was reinforced by a severe time constraint: participants were exposed 
to an unpleasant sound if they did not respond to the less frequent stimulus quick enough. 
Expectations – in the form of trial-by-trial predictions – did indeed conform to the actual 
variations in stimulus frequency soon enough. Preparation, and response times, followed 
along initially, with the fastest responses to the most frequent stimulus. When the additional 
task demand was introduced, participants immediately adhered to it and gave their fastest 
responses to the less frequent stimulus in order to avoid the deadline “punishment”. While 
they now consistently responded the quickest to the less frequent stimulus, indicating an 
increased preparation of that response, their expectation pattern remained unchanged. 
Participants realized that another stimulus was (still) more frequent and predicted it 
accordingly. This finding shows that while expectation and preparation can go along, and 
often do, they can also diverge. This makes it implausible to think of explicit expectation as a 
mere side-effect, or epiphenomenon, of already ongoing preparatory processes. People can 
seemingly expect one thing and prepare for another. 
Given this finding, what is the role of expectation in action control? Do people even use 
it to prepare for action? To answer this question, we compared trials in which the imperative 




confirmed. Indeed, participants were able to respond much faster to a correctly predicted 
stimulus. Interestingly, this was the case for all stimulus frequencies: even with highly 
infrequent stimuli, participants relied on their prediction and suffered substantial performance 
costs if their expectation was disappointed. From this finding follows that verbalized 
predictions are indeed a valid indicator of subjective expectation. And while expectation 
doesn’t necessarily equal preparation, the former can effectively feed into the latter. This is 
not to say that preparation is solely determined by expectation. As Miller & Anbar (1981) 
pointed out, frequency effects on response times can arise along two routes: by subjective 
expectation and by strengthening S-R associations. Our findings are compatible with such an 
integrative account of associative as well as expectation-based action preparation. While 
associative mechanisms are better studied and understood, expectation as a source of 
preparation and a key “player” in action control is only slowly receiving the scientific 
attention it deserves. 
In addition to past experience, expectation can also be based on situational cues. The 
distinction between these two sources of expectation has been largely overlooked in research 
on expectation effects. In this study, we compared the effects of subjective predictions with 
those of either informative or non-informative external cues. Subjective verbal predictions 
entailed the largest effects on response times and retained a significant impact even after the 
introduction of the additional response deadline. On the other hand, the influence of the non-
informative cues was effectively removed by the additional task demand. As the self-
generated predictions were equally unreliable, this suggests subjective expectations are 
preferentially processed and trigger preparation even if task demands favor a different course 
of action. With informative and reliable cues, a similar pattern emerged: they retained a 
significant impact in spite of adverse task demands. As Kunde and colleagues (2007) argue, 




translated into preparation (of perception or action) as this is usually beneficial to optimize 
behavior in real life. Artificial external cues don’t share this processing privilege by default 
and have to first prove their usefulness (reliability). 
The bottom line of the first study is that explicit expectation really does affect 
preparation. Contrary to the notion of explicit expectation as a mere by-product of 
preparation (cf. Soon et al., 2008), our findings ascribe it a causal role in controlling 
behavior. In investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying action control it is therefore 
expedient to look at subjective expectation and to include appropriate measures. We found 
that self-generated trial-by-trial predictions are a valid indicator of subjective expectation and 
offer a practical solution for measuring this expectation in experimental paradigms. 
Compared to expectation induced by external cues, expectation self-generated internally 
appears to possess different properties. A more in-depth analysis of the cognitive processes 
involved in these two types of expectation is the focus of the following study. 
3.2. Study II: Stronger effects of self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations in 
event-related potentials (Kemper, Umbach et al., 2012) 
The goal of the second study was to investigate the differences between self-generated 
subjective expectation and cue-induced expectation in regard to the impact on preparation. To 
examine the cognitive processes involved in these two types of expectation, we included 
event-related brain potentials (ERPs). It has been postulated that anticipating appropriate 
environmental conditions is fundamental for efficient goal-directed action (e.g., Kunde et al., 
2007). Previous studies of anticipation and expectation have mostly exclusively relied on the 
use of external cues. While this is usually justified with the lack of control over more 
subjective measures such as self-generated predictions, the presumed equivalence between 




literature, Acosta (1982) found stronger effects of self-generated compared to cue-induced 
expectations. Our study was aimed to replicate and expand this finding. 
Human actions can be driven by intentions (endogenous) or be triggered in response to 
a stimulus (exogenous). The differentiation between these two “routes to action” is supported 
by a large body of evidence (Herwig, Prinz & Waszak, 2007). In intentional, goal-directed 
action, expectation takes a central role in guiding preparatory processes. But how does 
expectation arise within the cognitive system? In most experimental paradigms, expectation 
is induced via the use of exogenous cues, rendering the subsequent preparation as reactive. 
Truly intentional action outside the laboratory, however, more likely relies on self-generated 
endogenous expectation. In the previous study (Umbach et al., 2012), we have shown that 
verbalized self-generated predictions are a valid indicator of subjective expectation, and that 
this expectation assumes a causal role in determining preparation and subsequent behavior. In 
the second study, we compared self-generated to cue-induced expectation and examined the 
underlying cognitive processes using electroencephalographic (EEG) measures. 
To allow for a direct comparison, we held all factors constant but the source of 
expectation. Participants either freely generated a prediction or read aloud a cue on each trial, 
verbalizing the same words in both conditions. There were no differences in the verbalization 
latencies between predictions and cues, eliminating this factor as a potential confound. Self-
generated predictions entailed stronger behavioral effects, with greater benefits in response 
time for correct predictions and greater costs for misses compared to cues. When the 
imperative stimulus matched the predicted or cued response – but not the stimulus – there 
was no performance benefit compared to complete mismatches. This finding suggests that 
response preparation depends on the imperative stimulus and was not triggered by 





A premotoric locus of the expectation effect was corroborated by our ERP results. A 
larger effect in the N2 component for self-generated predictions corresponds to the view that 
these involve endogenous attention processes to a greater degree than cues. The P3 
component exhibited a larger amplitude and earlier peak for correct predictions (compared to 
correct cues), indicating a stronger impact of uncertainty resolution with self-generated 
predictions. In the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), onsets reflected the behavioral 
results, with facilitation only for (complete) stimulus matches, but not for (partial) response 
matches. According to our ERP results, the expectation effect can therefore be attributed to 
perceptual and/or central parts of the preparation process. Attentional resources pertaining to 
expected stimulus properties are seemingly allocated to a greater degree following self-
generated predictions. Exogenous cues with a similar (low) reliability are processed with 
much more uncertainty. 
In keeping with the distinction between reactive, stimulus-based action and proactive, 
intention-based action (Herwig, Prinz & Waszak, 2007), the impact of expectation on action 
preparation might also differ according to its generation. Expectation can arise endogenously 
within the cognitive system, based on past experience and current goals. It can also be 
sparked by exogenous cues. While cues can potentially act as rather automatic triggers for a 
specific expectation (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), subjective predictions are generated 
only intentionally. As such, it seems plausible that participants are more likely to be in an 
intention-based mode if they generate expectations themselves. Our results indicate that it is 
necessary to differentiate between self-generated and cue-induced expectations when 
studying goal-directed action. 
In this study we have shown that self-generated expectations differ from cue-induced in 
a range of premotoric processing stages and result in stronger behavioral effects. Predicting a 




greater degree compared to reacting to a cue. When a self-generated prediction was met by 
the imperative stimulus, participants enjoyed larger benefits in response time (compared to a 
correctly cued stimulus). Our results point to functional differences between endogenous and 
exogenous sources of expectation. As expectations always pertained to characteristics of the 
stimulus in the first two studies, we wanted to see whether these differences also hold for 
expectations on the more abstract level of task sets. This question was the starting point for 
the next and final study. 
3.3. Study III: The impact of self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations on 
preparation for task sets (Umbach et al., 2013) 
The third and final study was conducted to answer the question whether subjective 
expectation allows for preparation beyond simple stimulus-response connections, for example 
on the more abstract level of task sets. Furthermore, we were interested in the role of 
expectation in cognitive conflict: if it enables preparation for a conflicting task, it should be 
able to reduce its detrimental impact on behavior. In the previous studies described here, 
expectations were always related to specific stimulus characteristics. For example, 
participants expected a red circle or a blue circle on a given trial, and were able to prepare a 
specific response associated with that stimulus. Expectation, in this case, could in principle 
have served to activate or amplify an existing stimulus-response connection.  
However, expectations could also pertain to the more abstract level of task sets. In 
many experimental paradigms – and in “real life” – the same stimulus can be associated with 
several different responses, depending on the current task or goal of the actor. For example, a 
blue circle could be classified according to its size (large/small) or its color shade 
(bright/dark), each option being associated with a different answer. In task switching 
paradigms, participants usually have to perform tasks of this kind, either repeating the same 




directed action (cf. Kunde et al., 2007), it might also – perhaps especially – be relevant in 
relation to task sets. Recent results (Duthoo et al., 2012) suggest a prominent role for 
subjective predictions in task switching. With this study, we wanted to expand upon these 
findings and examine the role of expectation in task set preparation and cognitive control. 
Cognitive conflicts can arise when incompatible response tendencies are activated 
simultaneously (e.g., Stroop, 1935; Simon, 1969; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Similarily, 
performance is impaired when people have to switch back and forth between different tasks. 
Research on task switching has shown that it is notoriously difficult for people to switch from 
one task set to another, while repeating the same task over and over again usually speeds up 
responses (see Kiesel et al., 2010, for an overview). Repetition benefits can certainly be 
explained by associative priming effects, where certain cognitive pathways are strengthened 
with practice. However, taking into account the importance of subjective expectation for 
action control, as attested by the first two studies, associative accounts might not give the full 
picture. If expectation enables preparation for task sets it should in theory be possible to 
prepare for conflicting tasks as well. As Duthoo et al. (2012) found expectation effects on 
task switching performance only for repetition trials, this point remains unresolved. In this 
study we therefore also addressed the question of whether preparation for conflict is possible 
on the basis of explicit subjective expectation. 
To examine the effects of explicit subjective expectation on preparation for task sets, 
we adapted the paradigm from Studies 1 and 2 for a task switching experiment. Participants 
had to either identify the size or color shade of a circle, with the task either repeating or 
alternating between trials. Before the imperative stimulus appeared, participants were asked 
to predict the task (size or color discrimination) or read aloud a word cue indicating the 
upcoming task. Correctly predicted tasks were carried out faster than false predictions, and 




the validity of predictions: with 80% task alternations (high switch probability), participants 
were able to score more correct predictions than with 50% task alternations (medium switch 
probability). The more reliable predictions in turn entailed a larger expectation effect. This is 
analogous to the finding from Study I, where the size of the cueing effect was contingent on 
cue validity. 
Importantly, and differing from the results of Duthoo et al. (2012), participants in our 
study were able to adequately prepare for task repetitions and alternations. In the high switch 
probability condition, correctly predicted task alternations were no slower than correctly 
predicted task repetitions. Overall, there was even a switch benefit in this condition, with task 
switches being faster than task repetitions. As task alternations were expected more 
frequently, this finding is in line with an expectation-based account of task preparation. 
However, as there was a repetition benefit in the medium switch probability condition, it 
appears reasonable to assume an additional influence of associative priming effects. By 
employing verbal predictions, we were able to rule out manual priming as a confounding 
factor (cf. Duthoo et al., 2012). 
In conclusion, we found that beyond the preparation of specific stimulus-response 
connections, explicit subjective expectation enables a more general preparation for tasks. An 
expected task is carried out faster than an unexpected one. Task performance cannot be 
reduced to simple associative priming effects, and subjective expectation should be taken into 
account in research on cognitive control. This contention is underlined by the finding that 
preparation for cognitive conflict is possible with expectation. An expected task alternation 
entails no more costs than an expected task repetition, at least when predictions prove to be 
reliable. Cognitive control, according to this view, is not so much a reactive mechanism 
contingent upon conflict in previous trials (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001). Instead, it is better 




As in the first two studies, results in Study III proved self-generated predictions to be more 
powerful than cue-induced expectations. 
4. Discussion 
As pointed out above, there is ample evidence to support the view that expectation is a 
key function of our cognitive system, and that learning and action rely upon it. Measuring 
expectation, however, remains difficult, as it is subjective by nature and not directly 
accessible. The agenda of this thesis was to answer three questions crucial to the use of 
explicit self-generated expectation in experimental paradigms: (1) Are verbalized predictions 
a valid indicator of internally generated expectations? (2) Do such expectations really affect 
action preparation? (3) What are the differences between expectations arising from external 
or internal sources? To answer these questions we conducted three studies as described 
above. 
In all of our studies, participants adapted their predictions to the observed task 
conditions and relied on them to prepare their responses. We found that verbalized 
predictions are in fact a valid indicator of subjective expectation and are suitable for use in 
experimental paradigms. Also, subjective expectation cannot be described as a mere by-
product of preparation, but instead feeds into preparation and therefore plays a role in action 
control. Self-generated expectation was shown to involve early attentional and central 
decision processes to a greater degree than cue-induced expectation. Consequently, self-
generated predictions entailed greater behavioral effects not only for stimulus expectations, 
but also for expectations regarding a task set. Subjective expectation is therefore also 
elemental in cognitive control. 
While the aim of this work was to show the functional role of explicit expectation in 
controlling behavior, the cognitive mechanisms by which it influences action control remain 




upon an “implicit” state of the cognitive system. As stimuli varied in frequency in Study I, 
the associations between the more frequent stimuli and responses were presumably 
strengthened and would yield a stronger activation. However, other options might receive 
some degree of activation too. When generating an explicit expectation from this activation 
state, the lesser options might be eliminated, amplifying the expectation for just one option in 
a winner-takes-it-all manner (cf. Kohonen, 1984). This additional mechanism could explain 
the benefit explicit expectations enjoy over implicit expectations in controlling behavior. 
While the latter are more or less close to each other on an activation scale, the former are 
unchallenged by competing options. 
As explicit expectations help us to make quick and positive decisions, it is an interesting 
question what the “normal” expectation mode of our cognitive system is. Research on verbal 
suppression indicates that explicit verbalizations are performed spontaneously to aid 
preparation for a task, albeit usually on a subvocal level (e.g., Miyake et al., 2004). If this 
holds as general principle, explicit expectations might be formed even when not formally 
required. The findings from our experiments with verbalized explicit expectations could then 
be extended to situations in which no verbalization takes place. Even when people are not 
aware of it, they might use this mechanism to clearly set apart one course of action from the 
many alternatives. 
If self-generated expectation assumes a central role in steering behavior, as we argue, 
what differentiates it from cue-induced expectation (compared in Studies II & III)? One 
possibility is that there is in fact only one type of expectation, self-generated internally by the 
cognitive system. If we ask our participants for their predictions, that’s the type that we 
retrieve, more or less directly. According to this idea, the use of cues is not really suited to 
induce expectations. Instead, the cues might or might not coincide with the internal 




self-generated verbalization. If cue and internal expectation don’t match, however, the cue 
might actually interfere with efficient preparation. As people were not expecting (and 
preparing for) what the cue indicated, our measures would not show any benefit for the cue in 
this case. In such a scenario, the use of cues would simply add noise to the measurement and 
diminish any potential expectation effects. Contrary to the argument that cues allow for a 
more controlled and accurate manipulation and measurement of expectation, this would mean 
that in fact self-generated predictions provide a “cleaner” way to assess expectation and are 
closer to the “true value” of the internal cognitive state. While our results did not allow us to 
substantiate this account, it might be a worthwhile endeavor to specifically address this 
question in future research. 
The importance of expectation in human cognition and behavior is emphasized in 
diverse theoretical trends. Proponents of the ideo-motor principle state that expectation is the 
starting point for all behavior (e.g., Kunde et al., 2007). According to this view, people act to 
achieve a given goal by matching an experienced outcome to an expected outcome. Returning 
to the soccer example from the beginning, the anticipation of how she will save the penalty 
initiates the goalkeeper’s dive for the ball. The action is carried out to achieve the desired 
effect in the environment. Recent research suggests that the acquisition of action-effect 
associations happens automatically (Gaschler & Nattkemper, 2012), but these effect 
anticipations are utilized only if participants can freely choose their responses in an intention-
based mode of action control (as compared to stimulus-driven responses). In the studies 
reported here, participants might have acquired action-effect anticipations in both the cueing 
and the prediction conditions. The effect of these expectations on behavior, however, was 
fully visible only when participants were required to generate predictions themselves. 
In a different vein, researchers into the field of reinforcement learning have long 




(e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). In this framework, learning takes place in the gap between 
an expected and an actual outcome, the so-called prediction error. If the goalkeeper’s 
prediction proves to be wrong, the experience allows her to learn about the shooter’s behavior 
and generate a more accurate expectation next time. Without a (disconfirmed) expectation, 
there would be nothing to learn. In implicit sequence learning, researchers have found largely 
reduced learning when timing constraints (RSI = 0 ms) disabled the opportunity to generate 
predictions (Martini, Furtner & Sachse, 2013). In the studies reported here, participants were 
actively required to generate predictions (and to express them vocally). Results from studies 
in implicit learning and action-effect learning suggest that predictions are spontaneously 
generated, without explicit requirements and without observable vocal expressions. 
Our findings underline the view that expectation is crucial to action preparation. 
Beyond this broad statement, the results presented here also point to the importance of 
including self-generated, subjective predictions in research on expectation effects. Outside 
the lab, reliable cues indicating which action best to perform next are often lacking. 
Subjective expectation therefore assumes a special role in enabling efficient behavior. An 
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Expectation enables preparation for an upcoming event and supports performance if the
anticipated situation occurs, as manifested in behavioral effects (e.g., decreased RT).
However, demonstrating coincidence between expectation and preparation is not suffi-
cient for attributing a causal role to the former. The content of explicit expectation may
simply reflect the present preparation state. We targeted this issue by experimentally
teasing apart demands for preparation and explicit expectations. Expectations often orig-
inate from our experience: we expect that events occurring with a high frequency in the
past are more likely to occur again. In addition to expectation, other task demands can
feed into action preparation. In four experiments, frequency-based expectation was pitted
against a selective response deadline. In a three-choice reaction time task, participants
responded to stimuli that appeared with varying frequency (60, 30, 10%).Trial-by-trial stim-
ulus expectations were either captured via verbal predictions or induced by visual cues.
Predictions as well as response times quickly conformed to the variation in stimulus fre-
quency. After two (of five) experimental blocks we forced participants by selective time
pressure to respond faster to a less frequent stimulus. Therefore, participants had to pre-
pare for one stimulus (medium frequency) while often explicitly expecting a different one
(high frequency). Response times for the less frequent stimulus decreased immediately,
while explicit expectations continued to indicate the (unchanged) presentation frequen-
cies. Explicit expectations were thus not just reflecting preparation. In fact, participants
responded faster when the stimulus matched the trial-wise expectations, even when task
demands discouraged their use. In conclusion, we argue that explicit expectation feeds
into preparatory processes instead of being a mere by-product.
Keywords: explicit expectation, action control, anticipation, preparation, task goals
INTRODUCTION
“You have to expect things of yourself before you can do
them,” as stated by basketball legend Michael Jordan (http://
www.biography.com/people/michael-jordan-9358066). Expecta-
tion is elemental in many types of behavior. It allows us to predict
and prepare for an upcoming event. It can be implicit, as when we
are not aware of it, or explicit. Here we focus on explicit expecta-
tions pertaining to an upcoming stimulus. These expectations can
be either based on experienced stimulus frequency (made explicit
through verbal predictions) or based on cues providing advance
information.
Many researchers stress the role of expectation in controlling
our behavior (e.g., Kunde et al., 2007; Duthoo et al., 2012). The
quote above is just one example of how we take for granted that
expectations influence how we go about a task. However, there are
prominent findings on action control, which demonstrate that the
colloquial notion of expectations influencing preparation needs
empirical support. For instance, a recent brain imaging study by
Soon et al. (2008) found brain activity reflecting the preparation
for a free choice up to 10 s before it entered awareness (mirroring
the classic “free will” experiment by Libet et al., 1983). Conscious
intention might thus only be an epiphenomenon of preparatory
processes in the brain (but see Trevena and Miller, 2010, for oppos-
ing evidence). Similarly, when asking someone to verbalize their
expectation (about a future event that they will have to respond
to) it is unclear whether the verbalized expectation simply reflects
a preparatory state or whether it can in addition influence task
processing. According to the latter view, an explicit expectation
(which might be rooted in preparatory processes to some extent)
feeds back into task processing. For instance, preparatory processes
might be slightly stronger for one vs. another stimulus at the
moment an explicit expectation is generated. The explicit expec-
tation might feature just one of the stimuli and preparation for
this option might be amplified in a winner-takes-it-all manner,
because an explicit expectation had to be generated.
While the notion of expectation as a distinct construct has
served as an example for redundant theorizing by critics of early
cognitive psychology (e.g., Skinner, 1950) it has gained consider-
able support through cognitive modeling, where prediction error
terms are at the core of many learning models (e.g., Sutton and
Barto, 1981), as well as through the discovery of neural correlates
(e.g., Schultz et al., 1997). According to Gallistel (2005) expecta-
tions have a causal role in human behavior in many economic
theories and are the driving force of fast adaptation in animals to
changed reinforcement schedules. The concept of expectation is
discussed under various labels such as anticipation (e.g., Kunde
et al., 2007), expectancy (e.g., Perruchet et al., 2006), and predic-
tion (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1981). Expectation encompasses both
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the act of looking forward as well as the thing looked forward to.
In the current study, we refer to expectation as the explicit ver-
bal prediction (or descriptive cue) of an upcoming stimulus in a
sequential choice task.
In the current study, we wish to put the notion that explicit
expectations have a causal role in preparation to the test. As in the
work by Soon et al. (2008) we use a broad concept of preparation,
encompassing any process, or state of the cognitive system that
promotes the (speedy and accurate) execution of a certain action.
This can take place anywhere along the cognitive processing chain,
from attentional preparation (perception) to response selection
(decision) to motor preparation (action). Faster responding has
been shown if orientation of attention is possible in advance and
facilitates perception (e.g., Posner and Petersen, 1990). On the
other hand, processes of response selection and execution also
benefit from preparation based on available advance informa-
tion (e.g., Rosenbaum and Kornblum, 1982), which then results
in faster responding. Wherever the facilitation takes place, a pre-
pared action should be executed faster (as measured by RT). Here,
we talk about match effects when comparing cases in which the
required response matches the expectation, vs. cases in which it
does not.
Expectations often originate from our experience: we expect
that events occurring with a high frequency in the past are more
likely to occur again in the future (e.g., Fitts et al., 1963). Accord-
ing to information theory (Shannon, 1948), information gain is
low if an event encountered frequently before re-occurs. On the
one hand, in this case little can be learned. On the other hand,
the occurrence of the expected event usually boosts performance,
whereas unexpected events can cause cognitive conflict and impair
performance (e.g., Bernstein and Reese, 1965; Posner and Snyder,
1975). In line with the view that explicit expectation can feed back
into action preparation, Miller and Anbar (1981) have suggested
two routes for the impact of event frequency on action prepara-
tion: directly by strengthening S-R associations and indirectly by
subjective expectations.
However, in many task situations explicit expectations and
other aspects of task preparation favor the same behavior. This
renders it difficult to demonstrate that explicit expectation is influ-
encing task processing above and beyond these other aspects. For
instance, a frequent S-R connection might be favored both by the
high strength of the S-R association as by an explicit expectation,
but it is difficult to demonstrate that the latter is actually feeding
back into preparatory processes in such a situation. Therefore, we
developed a paradigm in which participants can be made to expect
one event (by event frequency) while another task demand (severe
time constraint on a stimulus which is not the most frequent one)
at the same time requires that they are preparing for a different
event. If explicit expectations have an effect on task processing in a
situation in which one would be better off preparing for a different
event than the one expected, this would considerably strengthen
the view that explicit expectations are feeding back into prepara-
tory processes. This approach borrows its rationale from Perlman
and Tzelgov (2006) who suggested scrutinizing effects that are
not adaptive. Often, cognitive psychology builds on concepts that
lend their credibility to adverse performance effects. If the effect of
interest disturbs efficient performance, it is hard to explain it away.
In their case, the concept of implicit learning (as distinct from con-
trolled learning processes that in some cases might run in parallel)
could be considerably supported by showing that implicit learn-
ing takes place even when it hampers performance – more learning
led to worse performance. Similarly, our notion of explicit expec-
tation as a distinct source of task processing could be backed by
demonstrating dysfunctional performance effects.
In line with our perspective, a recent study by Duthoo et al.
(2012) points toward the use of expectation even when it is invalid.
We want to extend this finding. If, for example, people expect an
event they know is very unlikely to occur, are they still preparing
for it? Finding performance gains in such a case (if the unlikely
event does occur) would suggest a functional role of expectation
(being translated into preparation), despite the largely dysfunc-
tional effects. As a stronger test for the impact of explicit expec-
tation on preparation we introduced a conflicting task demand
promoting the preparation of an option different from the one
expected. Preparation in terms of “response readiness” (Rosen-
baum and Kornblum, 1982) should be susceptible to other influ-
ences besides advance information or stimulus expectation. For
example, the reinforcement of a certain response should increase
its preparation state even if expectation based on past experience
or situational cues favors a different response. Significant match
effects in this case would suggest an influence of explicit expecta-
tion even when it is maladaptive. On the other hand, following
the view of conscious intention as epiphenomenon of uncon-
scious determinants of behavior (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al.,
2008), explicit expectations in our study should change in line with
changes in preparation. If explicit expectation is merely reflecting
rather than influencing task preparation, then explicit expectation
should change when task preparation is experimentally changed.
There is evidence,however, that subjective expectations can deviate
from action preparation based on priming or associative learning
(Perruchet et al., 2006). If explicit expectation is assumed to have
a function in cognitive processing (as opposed to being a mere by-
product) it should not be altered by a task demand that selectively
manipulates preparation.
In addition to past experience, expectation can also be based
on situational cues. The distinction between these two sources of
expectation has been largely overlooked in research on expecta-
tion effects (but see Acosta, 1982). Results from our lab (Kemper
et al., 2012) point to significant differences: self-generated predic-
tions are accompanied by a distinctive expectation state visible in
the contingent negative variation of the electroencephalogram and
have a stronger effect on sensoric potentials compared to external
cues, resulting in larger behavioral effects. In order to target the
role of explicit expectations in preparation on a broad basis, we
used both types of explicit expectations in the current study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In a series of four experiments, we used a three-choice reaction
time task. Stimuli were displayed with different frequencies, with
one stimulus being presented in 60% of all trials, another one
in 30%, and the last in 10% of all trials. Participants responded
to each stimulus by pressing one of three keys. As a measure of
trial-wise subjective expectation we asked participants to verbally
predict the upcoming stimulus on each trial (Experiment 1: verbal
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predictions). To control for effects of this verbalization procedure,
we ran a variant where no predictions were required (Experiment
2: no predictions). In two additional experiments, we replaced
the self-generated predictions with external cues indicating the
upcoming stimulus. Cues were either not predictive of the subse-
quent stimulus presentation (Experiment 3: non-informative cues),
or they correctly indicated the upcoming stimulus on 80% of all
trials (Experiment 4: informative cues). In order to test for effects
of explicit expectation when it is not perfectly in line with other
demands for task preparation, we introduced a response deadline
for the medium frequency stimulus toward the second half of all
experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PREDICTIONS
Responses to the more frequent stimuli should generally be faster
because of stronger S-R associations and because they are expected
more often (Miller and Anbar, 1981). Subjective predictions (in
Experiment 1) should also reflect this frequency pattern, with
participants more often predicting the more frequent stimuli. A
common phenomenon in this context is the tendency of people
to match their predictions to the observed probabilities, result-
ing in fewer correct predictions compared to an optimal strategy
(i.e., always predict the most frequent event). This phenomenon
has been described as probability matching (e.g., Gaissmaier and
Schooler, 2008). Participants should display the same tendency in
our task if they really try to predict the upcoming stimulus. There-
fore, finding a frequency effect in explicit expectations provides a
manipulation check to ensure that participants are in fact correctly
performing the task of verbalizing their expectations in our exper-
iment. While actual stimulus presentation was unrelated to these
subjective predictions, responses should be faster after (coinciden-
tal) correct predictions if people use their predictions to prepare
for task execution.
Faster responses to correctly predicted stimuli (match effects)
would point toward a mandatory use of subjective expectation in
action preparation. Since there is no relation between participants’
predictions and the actual stimulus they have to respond to, there is
no reliable gain for them in following their predictions. This holds
in particular for predictions of the two less frequent stimuli. To
challenge the assumption of a mandatory use of explicit expecta-
tions even further, we introduced an additional task demand with
the goal of diverting preparatory processes away from the response
to the expected stimulus. After two of five experimental blocks
participants were instructed to give particularly fast responses
to occurrences of the medium frequency stimulus (30%). Slow
responses on these trials were punished by presenting an unpleas-
ant noise which acted as a negative reinforcement. This additional
task demand was therefore at odds with the pattern set up by
the stimulus frequencies. While stimulus frequency and subjective
expectations should lead to faster responses for the most frequent
stimulus, the additional task goal (avoid the unpleasant noise)
should lead to a stronger preparation for the medium frequency
stimulus. It makes preparation on the basis of frequency expec-
tations less useful because preparing for the predicted response
may result in hearing the aversive sound in some cases (i.e., when
the frequent stimulus is predicted and prepared and the medium
frequent stimulus occurs and is responded to too slowly). Still
finding match effects under these conditions would be further
evidence for the mandatory use of explicit expectation in prepar-
ing for an upcoming task. To the extent participants are able to
adjust their preparation to the requirements of the actual task one
could expect reduced expectation match effects in blocks three to
five: participants should rely less on their stimulus predictions if
the medium frequent response is reinforced.
Match effects (faster responses following correct predictions)
are in line with our idea that people use their explicit subjective
expectations in action preparation. However, there is the possibil-
ity that these expectations are simply a by-product of preparation
without functional use. In this case, participants should adjust
their predictions in line with the changes in action preparation
once the additional task demand is established. If participants in
fact prepare to respond to the medium frequency stimulus, and if
their stimulus expectations are inseparably linked to this prepa-
ration (as in “reading out” an internal preparation state deter-
mined by the strength of specific S-R associations), this should be
reflected in their prediction frequencies. In this case, match effects
might not be reduced (see above), as both preparation and predic-
tion would follow the altered task demands. If, on the other hand,
people generate expectations independently of action preparation
that is fueled by a second task demand, the frequency pattern
should remain intact in their subjective predictions.
EXPERIMENT 2: NO PREDICTIONS
In Experiment 1 verbal predictions were required before each stim-
ulus occurrence resulting in a dual-task like situation: to generate
verbal predictions and to perform the manual choice reaction task.
This could have resulted in different processing of the choice task
as compared to solely producing choice reactions. In order to verify
the results found for frequency and, particularly, the effect of selec-
tive reinforcement of the medium frequent stimulus, we repeated
the experiment without verbal predictions.
EXPERIMENT 3: NON-INFORMATIVE CUES
Expectation effects are most often investigated by using external
advance information (provided by cues, e.g., Posner and Snyder,
1975; Miller and Anbar, 1981; Mattler, 2004). It has been shown,
however, that expectations induced by cues affect performance
differently from predictions generated by participants themselves
(Kemper et al., 2012). Against this background we repeated Exper-
iment 1 and replaced verbal predictions with visual, non-verbal
cues that announced one of the three stimuli in advance before the
imperative stimulus was presented. The probability of match was
kept at approximately the same level as in the prediction exper-
iment by presenting the cues with the same frequencies as the
stimuli (10, 30, and 60%) but randomized independently of stim-
ulus presentation. The general effect of stimulus frequency should
be similar to the previous experiments, as well as the impact of the
selective response deadline. In line with previous studies (Acosta,
1982; Kemper et al., 2012) we expect a smaller match effect with
cues than with predictions.
EXPERIMENT 4: INFORMATIVE CUES
We conducted Experiment 4 for two reasons. First, the use of
non-informative cues is quite atypical for investigating expecta-
tion effects by the help of external advance information. Usually,
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cueing effects on preparation appear only with highly reliable cues
(e.g., Alpay et al., 2009; Scheibe et al., 2009). The reason for find-
ing an effect under such unfavorable conditions as in Experiment 3
might lie in feature overlap between cue and stimulus. Second, we
wanted to explore an idea that could explain the difference in effec-
tiveness between explicit expectations generated by the individual
or provided by external advance information. As the overall real
validity of predictions (Experiment 1) and cues (Experiment 3)
was comparable the difference might in fact go back to the degree
to which participants rely on their expectation, depending on its
source. One possible mechanism could be that participants weight
self-generated predictions stronger and that external information
has to be of a much higher validity to be included into controlled
action preparation, or, alternatively, predictions and cues differ in
subjective usefulness.
Therefore, in Experiment 4 we increased the probability of
match between cue and stimulus feature to 80%. Under these
conditions a much larger effect of expectation match than in
Experiment 3 should be observable. We expect comparable effects
of stimulus frequency as in the previous experiments, as well as an
effect of selectively reinforcing the medium frequent stimulus by
use of a deadline.
Participants
One hundred five undergraduate students of psychology and other
fields (74 women, mean age = 24.9 years) participated in individ-
ual sessions lasting approximately 90 min (Experiments 1 and 2)
or 60 min (Experiments 3 and 4). Participants either received par-
tial course credit or were paid 8–12 euros for their time. They
provided written informed consent, particularly to the exposure
to aversive sounds.
Design and procedure
In all of the experiments reported here, we used a three-choice
reaction time task. Three different shapes served as stimuli – star,
house, and cross – that were presented in one of three colors, red,
green, or blue. Each stimulus could be named by a monosyllabic
word in order to provide for approximately equal verbalization
times (for Experiment 1; German “Stern,” “Haus,” “Kreuz,” or
“rot,” “grün,” “blau”). Stimuli were displayed centrally on a 17′′
CRT computer monitor with a light gray background and occu-
pied approximately 2.2 cm in width and height (corresponding to
a visual angle of about 6.4˚ at a viewing distance of 60 cm). Three
keys (V, B, and N) on a standard Windows keyboard were mapped
by instruction either to the three shapes or the three colors, with
the relevant feature varying between participants. The task and
stimuli are shown in Figure 1.
Frequency of the three possible shapes or colors, respectively,
was predetermined in the stimulus set to yield three frequency
classes, frequent (60%), medium (30%), and infrequent (10%) for
the relevant stimulus feature. Occurrence of the irrelevant feature
was equally distributed and co-occurrence was balanced across
features. Half of the participants used shapes as relevant feature
for predictions and response selection and the others used color.
The irrelevant feature was not used in this task.
Participants completed five blocks of 120 trials for a total of












FIGURE 1 |Task used in Experiment 1. On each trial, participants had to
verbalize their prediction for the upcoming stimulus (in this case “star”).
After 2500 ms the stimulus appeared on screen (in this case a house,
signifying a mismatch) and participants had manually respond by pressing
one of three keys. The next trial started 500 ms after the response. For any
given participant, only one of the two stimulus features (shape, color) was
relevant throughout the task (in this case, both predictions and responses
pertained to the shape of a stimulus).
frequent in 32 trials, and the infrequent stimulus in 12 trials per
block. After the first two experimental blocks the additional task
demand was introduced. Participants were informed that their
reactions to the medium frequency stimulus (which was simply
described by its label) had to be extra fast if they wanted to avoid
the annoying sound on their headphones. This aversive auditory
stimulus, a white noise burst of about 75 dB, had been demon-
strated to participants at the beginning of the session before they
gave their consent to the procedure. The response deadline for
the medium frequency stimulus was individually determined at
the median reaction time for the frequent stimulus in the preced-
ing Block 2 and kept constant over the remaining three blocks.
If participants exceeded this deadline on any given trial with the
medium frequency stimulus, the aversive sound was immediately
presented on their headphones and ended 500 ms after their (late)
reaction.
At the end of the session participants were asked to estimate
the frequency of the relevant stimulus feature.
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PREDICTIONS
On every trial, participants were asked for their subjective expecta-
tion regarding the upcoming stimulus. According to the relevant
stimulus feature, the prompt “Farbe?” or “Form?” (German for
color or shape) were displayed on the screen. Participants then had
2500 ms to verbalize their expectation. If voice onset was registered
more than 1500 ms after the onset of the prompt, participants
were reminded to speak as soon as the prompt is shown on the
next trial. In addition, participants were randomly reminded in
10% of all trials to speak loudly and clearly. After this expectation
interval (2500 ms after the prompt onset) the stimulus was shown
and participants had to press the corresponding key on the key-
board. The following trial started 500 ms after the response. The
experimental blocks were preceded by three practice blocks of 18
trials each in which manual responses and verbal expectations were
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first trained separately and then combined. Frequency and com-
binations of relevant and irrelevant stimulus feature were equally
distributed in the practice blocks.
Verbal expectations were captured with a microphone head-
set and identified using a real-time speech recognition program
implemented in Matlab (Donkin et al., 2009). At the beginning of
the experimental session, the software was trained to the individ-
ual voice with the participant repeating the words in the response
set 10 times. This was followed immediately by an accuracy check
with 10 additional exemplars per word. If recognition accuracy
was below 95% (i.e., more than one misidentification) the original
training was restarted, otherwise the additional exemplars were
added to the pool of training exemplars and the experiment com-
menced. Recognition accuracy was tested again at the end of the
session.
EXPERIMENT 2: NO PREDICTIONS
The task was the same as in Experiment 1, with the only difference
that participants were not instructed to generate verbal predic-
tions at the beginning of each trial. Instead of the prompts used in
Experiment 1 a fixation dot was displayed for 2500 ms to keep the
timing equivalent to Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 3: NON-INFORMATIVE CUES
Again, the task was largely the same as in Experiment 1. Instead
of prompting participants to verbalize their subjective expecta-
tions on each trial symbolic cues were presented predicting the
upcoming stimulus. These cues were similar to the imperative
stimuli but only varied in the relevant feature: if a participant
had to respond to the shape of a (colored) stimulus the cues con-
sisted of black shapes, if color was the relevant feature colored
circles were used as cues. Participants did not have to verbal-
ize the cues. Cues were displayed 1000 ms after the last response
and remained visible for 1000 ms followed by a blank screen for
another 1000 ms, after which the imperative stimulus appeared.
Thus, the response-stimulus interval was the same as in the other
experiments (3000 ms) and the timing of the cues was similar to
the verbal predictions in Experiment 1. Importantly, cue presen-
tation was randomized independently and was not related to the
subsequent stimulus presentation. Therefore cues exhibited the
same low overall validity as the predictions in Experiment 1: on
only 46% of all trials was a cue followed by the corresponding
stimulus (60% for the frequent stimulus, 30% for the medium,
and 10% for the infrequent stimulus).
EXPERIMENT 4: INFORMATIVE CUES
The task was the same as in Experiment 3, except that the validity
of cues was 80% for all frequencies. Thus, in 80% of all trials a cue
was followed by the corresponding stimulus.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PREDICTIONS
Three participants were excluded for producing too many false
responses (>10%), another two participants were excluded
because of problems with the speech recognition software (<75%
accuracy in the post-experiment test). Data of the remaining 19
participants were analyzed. For the following analyses all trials
were recruited, including those with immediate stimulus repe-
titions. The proportion of stimulus repetitions naturally were
related to stimulus frequency, with 60% repetition trials for the
frequent stimulus, and 29 and 9% respectively for the medium
and infrequent stimuli. All results reported here remain unal-
tered if stimulus repetitions, i.e., 46% of all trials, are excluded. RT
analyses are based on correct responses only, excluding error tri-
als. The response deadline, representing the median reaction time
for the frequent stimulus in Block 2, was on average set at 424 ms
(SD = 76 ms), with individual participants ranging between 303
and 633 ms. In 28% of the trials with the reinforced stimulus,
participants passed this deadline and were consequently exposed
to the aversive sound (32% in Block 3, 24% in Block 4, 27% in
Block 5).
Our experiments, except Experiment 2 with no predictions,
included three within-subjects factors: match (testing the effective-
ness of explicit expectation), block (mirroring the effect of training
and, more importantly, of the introduction of the response dead-
line from block 2 to block 3), and frequency. A three-factorial
repeated measures ANOVA could not be run as participants did
not contribute enough data points to one of the cells (match trials
for the infrequent stimulus occurred too rarely to get reliable medi-
ans per block). Therefore, three two-way ANOVAs were run over
the response times and error rates of all experiments: one with
frequency and block to examine the general effect of selectively
reinforcing the medium frequent response, one with match and
frequency to look for a potential dependency of the size of expec-
tation effects on experienced stimulus frequency, and one with
match and block to examine the interaction of expectation and the
deadline manipulation. In the context of a Bonferroni correction
we divided the critical significance level (alpha = 0.05) by three in
order to account for repeated tests on one and the same data set.
Before the introduction of the response deadline, RTs and errors
followed stimulus frequency. The infrequent stimulus led to the
slowest and most error prone reactions and the responses to fre-
quent stimuli were the fastest and most accurate. The medium
frequency stimuli lay in between. With the response deadline, in
the last three blocks, responses to the medium frequency (rein-
forced) stimulus became faster than responses to the more frequent
stimulus, while response times for all stimuli decreased. A two-
way repeated measures ANOVA with the factors frequency and
block revealed main effects for both frequency, F(2, 36) = 81.63,
p < 0.001, and block, F(4, 72) = 82.27, p < 0.001, as well as an
interaction, F(8, 144) = 15.91, p < 0.001. Importantly, the selec-
tive speedup of responses to the medium frequent stimulus was
not achieved at the expense of a higher error rate for the frequent
stimulus (see Figure 2, top left). The same effects as in RT were
found in the error rates (all p < 0.001).
Verbal predictions already reflected the frequency differences
in the first block and approached the actual values over the course
of the experiment. Importantly, this pattern was not altered with
the introduction of the response deadline in the third block (see
Figure 3). Therefore, participants continued to expect the most
frequent stimulus most often but reacted fastest to the medium
frequency stimulus. The three different stimuli were predicted
in the order of their frequency of occurrence (most often the
most frequent stimulus, less often the medium frequent stimulus,
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 378 | 527
















































































































































FIGURE 2 | Response times and error rates for Experiments 1–4. Response
times (on the top of each panel) exhibit an effect of stimulus frequency (with
the frequent stimulus, marked by the solid line, leading to faster responses
than the medium and infrequent stimuli) in the first two blocks, as well as an
effect of the additional task goal starting in the third block (with the reinforced
medium stimulus getting faster responses). The same pattern is visible in
conditions with verbal predictions (Experiment 1) and without (Experiment 2)
and also with low and high validity non-verbal cues (Experiments 3 and 4).
and least often the rare stimulus). This rank order of predic-
tion frequencies stayed the same over the experiment, so that
prediction behavior was highly correlated over blocks (correla-
tion of ranks between successive blocks: τ = 0.74, 0.79, 0.92, and
0.83, all p < 0.001), regardless of the changed pattern in choice
performance.
Stimuli matched predictions in 42% of all trials (with a mini-
mum of 40% in Block 1 and a maximum of 44% in Block 4; 51%
matches for the frequent stimulus, 30% for the medium, and 18%
for the infrequent stimulus). Response times were shorter for tri-
als in which the stimulus matched the participant’s prediction, as
compared to mismatch trials. This match effect was visible for all
stimulus frequencies. The ANOVA with the factors match and fre-
quency revealed main effects on RT for match, F(1, 18) = 130.72,
p < 0.001, and frequency, F(2, 36) = 74.55, p < 0.001, but no inter-
action match × frequency, F(2, 36) = 2.77, ns. After introducing
the response deadline for the medium stimulus, the mean differ-
ence between match and mismatch trials declined from 110 ms in
Block 2 to 60 ms in Block 3 (see Figures 4 and 5, top left).The
ANOVA with the factors match and block revealed main effects
on RT for match, F(1, 18) = 107.63, p < 0.001, and block, F(4,
72) = 81.14, p < 0.001, as well as an interaction match × block, F(4,
72) = 30.56, p < 0.001. The same effects were found in the error
rates (all p < 0.001).
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FIGURE 3 | Predictions in Experiment 1 already reflect the varying
stimulus frequencies in the first block and approach the actual values
(60, 30, and 10%) over the course of the experiment. The additional task
goal introduced in the third block does not change this pattern.
The post hoc estimates of stimulus occurrence in percent made
by the participants also provided a good approximation of the
actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 63%, the medium
at 24%, and the infrequent stimulus at 13%.
EXPERIMENT 2: NO PREDICTIONS
One participant was excluded from analyses for producing too
many false responses (>10%). Data of the remaining 21 par-
ticipants were analyzed. The response deadline was on average
fixed to 491 ms (SD = 89 ms), with individual participants ranging
between 333 and 693 ms. On 8% of the trials with the reinforced
stimulus, participants exceeded this deadline and were conse-
quently exposed to the aversive sound (9% in Block 3, 7% in Block
4, 9% in Block 5).
The same pattern emerged as in Experiment 1: Responses were
faster and more accurate to the more frequent stimuli in the first
two experimental blocks, before the introduction of the response
deadline. With the deadline, in the last three blocks, responses
to the reinforced medium frequent stimulus became faster than
responses to the frequent stimulus, while response times for all
stimuli decreased (see Figure 2, top right). A two-way repeated
measures ANOVA on RTs with the factors frequency and block
revealed main effects of both stimulus frequency, F(2, 40) = 71.87,
p < 0.001, and block, F(4, 80) = 58.96, p < 0.001, as well as an inter-
action, F(8, 160) = 25.02, p < 0.001. The same effects were found
in the error rates (all p < 0.001).
The post hoc estimates again provided a good approximation
of the actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 64%, the
medium at 25%, and the infrequent stimulus at 11%.
EXPERIMENT 3: NON-INFORMATIVE CUES
Seven participants were excluded from analyses for producing
too many false responses (>10%). Data of the remaining 30
participants were analyzed. The response deadline was on aver-
age fixed at 502 ms (SD = 75 ms), with individual participants
ranging between 383 and 695 ms. On 8% of the trials with the
reinforced stimulus participants exceeded this deadline and were
consequently exposed to the aversive sound (9% in Block 3, 7% in
Block 4 and 5).
Similar to Experiment 2, RTs followed stimulus frequency in
Blocks 1 and 2, but the medium frequency stimulus elicited the
fastest responses when the reinforcement procedure started after
Block 2 (compare Figure 2, bottom left). A two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with frequency and block revealed main effects
on RT for frequency, F(2, 58) = 107.33, p < 0.001, and block, F(4,
116) = 71.45, p < 0.001, as well as an interaction frequency × block,
F(8, 232) = 61.28, p < 0.001. The same effects were found in the
error rates (all p < 0.001). The RT effect of cue match was clearly
present for all frequencies as well, but smaller than the effect of
expectation match in Experiment 1. The ANOVA with match and
frequency revealed main effects on RT for match, F(1, 29) = 21.57,
p < 0.001, and frequency, F(2, 58) = 80.11, p < 0.001, but no
interaction match × frequency, F(2, 58) = 0.43, ns. In the error
rates, only frequency yielded a significant effect, F(2, 58) = 16.64,
p < 0.001. After the introduction of the response deadline the
match effect was diminished from 35 ms in Block 2 to 19 ms in
Block 3 (see Figures 4 and 5, bottom left). The third ANOVA
with match and block revealed main effects on RT for match, F(1,
29) = 23.41, p < 0.001, and block, F(4, 116) = 44.47, p < 0.001, as
well as an interaction match × block, F(4, 116) = 13.74, p < 0.001.
The same effects were found in the error rates (all p < 0.01).
The post hoc estimates again provided a good approximation
of the actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 57%, the
medium at 30%, and the infrequent stimulus at 13%.
EXPERIMENT 4: INFORMATIVE CUES
Four participants were excluded from analyses for producing too
many false responses (>10%). Data of the remaining 18 partici-
pants were analyzed. The response deadline was on average fixed
to 497 ms (SD = 120 ms), with individual participants ranging
between 311 and 708 ms. On 11% of the trials with the reinforced
stimulus participants passed this deadline and were consequently
exposed to the aversive sound (13% in Block 3, 12% in Block 4,
and 9% in Block 5).
As shown in Figure 2 (bottom right), RTs followed stimulus
frequency in the first two blocks until the onset of the reinforce-
ment of the medium frequency stimulus at the beginning of Block
3 led to faster responses to this stimulus. The two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with frequency and block revealed main effects
on RT for frequency, F(2, 34) = 45.83, p < 0.001, and block, F(4,
68) = 34.74, p < 0.001, as well as an interaction frequency × block,
F(8, 136) = 22.99, p < 0.001. The same effects were found in the
error rates (all p < 0.001). RT effects of match between cue and
stimulus were much more pronounced than in the low validity
variant explored in the previous experiment and were not reduced
after the introduction of the response deadline (102 ms in Block 2,
98 ms in Block 3, see Figures 4 and 5, bottom right). Accordingly,
the ANOVA with match and block revealed main effects on RT for
match, F(1, 17) = 110.14, p < 0.001, and block, F(4, 68) = 41.30,
p < 0.001, but no interaction match × block, F(4, 68) = 0.55, ns.
The third ANOVA with match and frequency revealed main effects
on RT for match, F(1, 17) = 113.20, p < 0.001, and frequency, F(2,
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FIGURE 4 | Match vs. mismatch trials for Experiments 1, 3, and 4
(pooled over frequencies). Responses following correct predictions
(match) in Experiment 1 are 117 ms faster on average compared to
incorrect predictions (mismatch) in the first two blocks; after the
introduction of the selective response deadline for the medium
frequency stimulus this difference is reduced to 60 ms on average. In
Experiment 3, using invalid cues (similar to the predictions of
Experiment 1), the difference between match and mismatch trials
averages 34 ms at the beginning and is down to 17 ms with the
additional task demand. Experiment 4 shows no reduction in this
mismatch effect, with 98 ms before and 100 ms after the introduction
of the deadline on average.
34) = 76.56, p < 0.001, but no interaction match × frequency, F(2,
34) = 7.56, ns.
The post hoc estimates again provided a good approximation
of the actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 56%, the
medium at 30%, and the infrequent stimulus at 14%.
DISCUSSION
In all four experiments reported here, stimulus frequencies (60,
30, 10%) were reflected in response times and error rates, with the
most frequent stimulus producing the fastest and most accurate
responses. While discussion about the role of conscious intention
in controlling behavior (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008; Trevena
and Miller, 2010; see Introduction) might be taken to suggest that
explicit expectations merely reflect other preparatory processes
but do not influence them, our results suggest that explicit expec-
tations feed back into task processing and thus have a causal
role. We disentangled explicit expectation from other forms of
preparation by adding a secondary task demand. With instruc-
tion and a response deadline combined with an aversive sound,
participants were encouraged to prepare for a different stimu-
lus (i.e., the medium frequency stimulus) than the one they were
expecting most often (i.e., the high frequency stimulus). Explicit
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FIGURE 5 | Mismatch effect for Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (displayed
by frequency). No differences in mismatch effect between
frequencies, similar reduction (Experiment 1) or stability (Experiment 3)
with the additional task goal introduced in Block 3. Values from
infrequent stimuli are statistically unreliable because of the low number
of match trials.
expectations affected task processing even when it would have
been beneficial not to rely on them: On the one hand, effects
of expectation conflicted with the requirement to respond faster
than the response deadline on the medium frequency stimulus.
This could have largely been avoided if participants had either
not have turned verbalized expectation into task preparation or,
alternatively, would have started to explicitly expect the medium
frequency stimulus in most or all trials. On the other hand, par-
ticipants showed faster response times when their expectation
matched rather than mismatched the stimulus even in case of the
infrequent stimulus – which they sometimes expected. Such an
expectation was mostly followed by the frequent or medium fre-
quent rather than the infrequent stimulus. In principle one could
have betted on and prepared for the frequent or medium stimu-
lus, despite verbalizing an expectation for the infrequent one. A
mismatch was much more likely than a match after such a predic-
tion, yet matches were faster than mismatches. It would have been
conceivable that participants show RT benefits of expectations
matching the stimuli in case of frequent and medium frequency
stimuli and a reversal of the expectation match effect in case of
the infrequent (10%) stimuli. For instance, Notebaert et al. (2009)
have reported that in cases with a majority of error trials RTs
are prolonged after the rare correct trials rather than after error
trials, suggesting that event frequency rather than match vs. mis-
match of task demands and action can drive performance costs.
This does not seem to count for explicit expectations, however.
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Thus, neither were explicit expectations themselves chosen flex-
ibly to boost performance, nor could the aftereffects of these
expectations be flexibly regulated. The results thus suggest that
explicit expectations influence rather than merely reflect other
preparatory processes and do so rather inflexibly. Explicit expec-
tations seem to count – even when they are not adaptive to current
task demands.
In the current experiments we took two different approaches by
measuring expectations through verbal predictions and inducing
them by cues. In Experiment 1 we asked participants to verbally
predict the upcoming stimulus on each trial and then respond to
the actual stimulus by pressing the corresponding key. Verbal pre-
dictions (as a measure of subjective expectation) mirrored actual
stimulus frequencies already in the first experimental block, with
participants predicting the most frequent stimulus on a higher
proportion of trials. When the imperative stimulus matched the
prediction on a given trial, participants responded much faster
compared to trials on which the stimulus violated their prediction.
This gain was similar for all three stimulus frequencies, suggesting
that participants used their predictions to prepare the response
even if it was unlikely to be fulfilled (18% for the infrequent stim-
ulus, compared to 51% for the frequent stimulus). Introducing the
response deadline for the medium frequency stimulus reduced this
match effect from 117 to 60 ms, while predictions themselves were
not altered.
In Experiment 2 we replicated the effects of stimulus frequency
without verbal predictions, ruling out the possibility that the
response time effects found in Experiment 1 were dependent on
the second task of explicitly verbalizing stimulus expectations.
In Experiment 3 we induced explicit expectations through sym-
bolic cues. As cue presentation was not related to the subsequent
stimulus, their predictive value was as low as that of the self-
generated predictions in Experiment 1. There was a small match
effect with faster responses following correct cues (34 ms) before
the introduction of the response deadline that was diminished to a
statistically non-significant difference (17 ms) with the additional
task demand. In Experiment 4, with cues correctly predicting the
upcoming stimulus in 80% of all trials, there was a large match
effect that was not reduced by the response deadline (98 ms before,
100 ms after the manipulation). This deviates from the patterns
found in Experiments 1 and 3, where the additional task demand
(fast responses on the medium frequency stimulus to avoid the
aversive tone) led to a reduction in the match effect.
DOUBLE IMPACT OF STIMULUS FREQUENCY
In addition to explicit expectations, RT was affected by stimu-
lus frequency in all four experiments. This is in line with ear-
lier calls to integrate associative as well as an expectancy-based
accounts of action preparation. For instance, Miller and Anbar
(1981) argue that frequency effects on response time can arise
directly (through the strength of S-R associations) and indirectly
(through subjective expectancies). Asking participants to verbal-
ize their expectations (in Experiment 1) might have led to larger
RT differences between stimuli of different frequency compared to
the variants without predictions (Experiment 2) or with external
cues (Experiments 3 and 4). Frequency effects might have been
prominent on two rather than just one path in Experiment 1.
As frequency effects remained evident after the introduction of
the response deadline for the medium frequency stimulus, this is
pointing toward an automatic effect of S-R frequency and as such
toward an independent contribution of this source.
Subjective expectations measured as predictions in Experiment
1 closely mirrored the frequency pattern, a phenomenon also
known as probability matching (e.g., Gaissmaier and Schooler,
2008, see below). Thus, performance in predicting the upcoming
stimulus was also influenced by the given frequency pattern. The
participants presumably made use of their prior experience rep-
resented in associations of varying strength. However, the effect
of subjective expectation and the general effect of frequency on
performance in the choice task appear to be independent from
each other. Match effects were of similar size for all frequencies, or,
to put it differently: the general effect of frequency proved to be
the same, regardless of expectation match. This also holds for the
experiments where cues instead of predictions were used. That is,
the influence of explicit expectation on task processing appears to
be different from other effects that arise from stimulus frequencies.
PREDICTIONS: MATCHING VS. MAXIMIZING
Predictions were generated and used in a less than optimal man-
ner. Participants could have maximized their correct predictions
(in Experiment 1) by always predicting the most frequent stimulus
(which would have lead to 60% matches). Instead, they apparently
tried to reproduce the observed stimulus frequencies in their pre-
dictions (resulting in only 42% matches). This behavior is in line
with the probability matching phenomenon (e.g., Gaissmaier and
Schooler, 2008). Trials with expectations matching the stimulus
were faster than those with a mismatch. For boosting performance
in the choice reaction task it would have been favorable to choose
to predict the most frequent stimulus on all trials in the first part
of the experiment and the medium frequency stimulus once the
response deadline on this stimulus was set in place. Maximizing
has been observed in the literature on strategy change in skill
acquisition (e.g., Touron and Hertzog, 2004; Gaschler and Fren-
sch, 2007, 2009) where people tend to exclusively choose the one
of two processing strategies that is the most suitable on most of
the trials. This however, might be an exception as in many other
task contexts probability matching has proven to be a robust phe-
nomenon (see, e.g., Gallistel, 2005, for a discussion). He suggested
that probability matching is a “hard-wired” policy which is useful
in dynamic environments as it guarantees continuous sampling of
the options so that an agent does not run the risk of missing to
notice changes in which options are currently more or less reward-
ing. Our results lend further support to this “hard-wired” view, as
the influence of the probability-matched expectations appears not
to be easily adapted to more promising strategies either. However,
we do not know for certain what the goals of our participants in
optimizing their task performance are. It is possible that they tried
to find a balance between the two tasks of realistically predict-
ing stimuli while performing rapidly and correctly on the choice
task. Therefore, instructing them to increase their proportion of
matches might change the pattern of results.
CONFLICTING TASK DEMAND ATTENUATES IMPACT OF EXPECTATION
The match effects we found, with faster responses following cor-
rect predictions and valid cues, are compatible with the idea that
explicit expectation serves as a trigger for action preparation and
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thus assumes a causal role in cognitive processing. However, there
are differences in the robustness of these match effects that depend
on the source of expectation on the one hand and on its validity
on the other hand.
The additional task demand of trying to respond quickly to the
medium frequency stimulus in order to avoid hearing the unpleas-
ant sound significantly reduced the match effects in Experiments
1 and 3, but not in Experiment 4. While in Experiment 4 the
cue was highly predictive of the stimulus, explicit expectations
(Experiment 1) and cues in Experiment 3 were equally unreli-
able. Arguably, the strong associations between cue and stimulus
in Experiment 4 were still fully effective under the response dead-
line, whereas the impact of the unreliable predictions in the other
experiments could be attenuated. Importantly, the match effect
was reduced for all stimuli to a similar extent. The predictions
that could have boosted the processing of the medium frequency
stimulus with the deadline attached to it, were apparently not
spared. Rather, participants seem to have relied somewhat less on
expectations in general.
While the influence of the non-informative cues (in Experiment
3) on response time was effectively removed by the additional task
demand, subjective predictions retained a significant impact. This
suggests that self-generated predictions are mandatorily processed
and trigger action preparation even if they are obviously unreliable
and if task demands favor the preparation of a different action. As
Kunde et al. (2007) argue, expectation is an integral component
of action control. Expectations are always generated and trans-
lated into preparation (of perception or action) as this is usually
beneficial to optimize behavior in real life. Artificial external cues
do not share this processing privilege by default and have to first
prove their usefulness (reliability). When they do, however, as in
Experiment 4 (with 80% valid cues), they retain their influence in
spite of the additional task demand.
EXPECT ONE THING, PREPARE FOR ANOTHER
The selective reinforcement of the medium frequent stimulus led
to a selective speed up of responses to the reinforced stimulus.
Thus, participants in our study apparently were able to predict
one thing while at least partly preparing for another. A similar
dissociation between explicit expectation and overt behavior has
been reported before (Perruchet et al., 2006) for simple reactions
in an associative learning experiment. In the “Perruchet effect,”
response time (as a measure of automatic activation) decreases
with increasing number of repeated associations, while explicit
expectation develops in the opposite direction, increasingly favor-
ing an alternation after longer runs of repetitions (the “gambler’s
fallacy”). However, in contrast to the build-up of associative effects,
in our study the change in performance occurred immediately after
instructing the new requirement, rather than gradually. The abrupt
effect of the deadline suggests that intentional control processes
can influence the extent to which learned S-R connections impact
behavior. The ordering of RTs by stimulus frequency was imme-
diately altered. With the stimulus-specific deadline, the RT for the
medium frequency stimulus surpassed RT for the frequent stim-
ulus. In line with the intentional weighting principle proposed by
Hommel et al. (2001), intentional control might put some extra
strength on a response alternative that would have been otherwise
weak and so alter the result of the competition for response selec-
tion. Put differently, if something we have learned earlier (as, e.g.,
expecting stimuli with a given frequency) conflicts with actual task
goals (as, e.g., responding fast to a less expected stimulus), behav-
ior will always be the result of resolving this – classical – conflict
situation (see Botvinick et al., 2001). If expectations conflict with
other task demands it seems feasible to prepare for something one
is not expecting.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that explicit expectation affects preparatory
processes and thus assumes a causal role in controlling behav-
ior. This finding speaks against the notion of explicit expectation
as a mere by-product of preparation. When we ask participants for
their subjective predictions about an upcoming event they have to
respond to, they are preparing for what they say (instead of telling
us what they are preparing for).
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Expectations regarding future events enable preparatory processes and allow for faster
responses to expected stimuli compared to unexpected stimuli. Expectations can have
internal sources or follow external cues. While many studies on expectation effects use
some form of cueing, a direct comparison with self-generated expectations involving
behavioral and psychophysiological measures is lacking. In the present study we com-
pare cue-induced expectations with self-generated expectations that are both expressed
verbally in a within-subjects design, measuring behavioral performance, and event-related
brain potentials (ERPs). Response time benefits for expected stimuli are much larger when
expectations are self-generated as compared to externally cued. Increased amplitudes in
both the N2 and P3 components for violations of self-generated expectations suggest that
this advantage can at least partially be ascribed to greater perceptual preparation. This
goes along with a missing benefit for stimuli matching the expected response only and is
mirrored in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Taken together, behavioral and ERP
findings indicate that self-generated expectations lead to increased premotoric prepara-
tion compared to cue-induced expectations. Underlying cognitive or neuronal functional
differences between these types of expectation remain a subject for future studies.
Keywords: self-generated expectations, cue-induced expectations, event-related brain potentials, N2, P3, lateralized
readiness potential
INTRODUCTION
Expectations play a crucial role in action control. Research on
effect-based action control has stressed that representations of
anticipated action effects play a role when performing an action
(e.g., Nattkemper et al., 2010). According to the ideo-motor prin-
ciple (see Shin et al., 2010, for a recent review) the mental represen-
tation of an anticipated action effect triggers the action (similar to
forward and inverse computational models of motor control, e.g.,
Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). For instance, the representation
of an open drawer might help us to initiate the pulling action. By
choosing actions according to the anticipated effects, people can
gain intentional control over their behavior (e.g., Kunde, 2001;
Pfister et al., 2010). They can consider expectations about upcom-
ing action effects for choosing between actions depending on
which effects they desire or not. As such, expectations about effects
stem from goals of the actor. They might not be directly caused
by current external stimulation, but rather be self-generated by
integrating goals and past external stimulation. Interestingly, this
view often does not directly translate to the methodology of exper-
iments on the role of action effect anticipation in action control.
For instance, the role of anticipated effects has been studied by
presenting action effects additionally as subliminal stimuli (e.g.,
Kunde, 2004) or irrelevant flankers (e.g., Zießler and Nattkemper,
2002). One could argue that presenting to-be-expected effects as
stimuli might trade experimental control against external validity,
as such a situation is not closely resembling action preparation dri-
ven by self-generated expectations. Conceivably, intentional action
control supposes self-generated expectations. These are likely to
interact with stimulus-based preparation but are unlikely identi-
cal to this. For instance, according to Kunde et al. (2007) actors use
anticipated action effects based on internal goals. Yet, stimuli have
an important role in this view, too. They disambiguate situations
as to whether or not an effect can be brought about by an action.
As many actions only lead to the desired outcomes in highly spe-
cific contexts, the role of a stimulus is to signal that in the current
context the link between expected effect and action is valid.
Taken together, this reasoning might suggest that the presumed
equivalence between self-generated expectations and cue-induced
expectations cannot be taken for granted. It is also conceivable
that self-generated expectations differ from expectations that are
directly triggered by external stimuli or cues. A similar distinc-
tion has been discussed with respect to internally triggered vs.
externally cued task switching (Arrington and Logan, 2005). Dif-
ferences between expectations based on external cues and internal
sources are also conceivable given the long history of debates con-
cerning motor patterns that are predominantly stimulus-triggered
vs. predominantly driven by a response goal. For instance, the
Baldwin–Titchener debate at the end of the nineteenth century
(e.g., Baldwin, 1895; Titchener, 1895) centered around the ques-
tion of whether or not response times (RTs) are regularly shorter
when people concentrate on the response rather than on expecting
the stimulus. An important insight of that debate was that people
can apparently choose between different modes for controlling the
same motor pattern.
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In line with these precursors, recent results point to differences
between intentional vs. reactive action. Surprisingly, a motor pat-
tern already triggered by an internal goal is incompatible with the
execution of the very same motor pattern in response to a stim-
ulus presented while the intentional action is in preparation (e.g.,
Astor-Jack and Haggard, 2005; Pfister et al., 2012). If an inter-
nally prepared action is truncated by a stimulus that requires the
same action that was intentionally prepared, RT costs result in
comparison to a situation where the response could be executed
without concurrent intentional preparation. The authors inter-
pret their results as evidence for distinct action systems that are
triggered either endogenously by intention or exogenously by an
imperative stimulus. Presenting the stimulus during intentional
action preparation therefore results in interference between both
systems and delays the action. In line with these results, Her-
wig et al. (2007) have differentiated two types of action control
modes, a stimulus-based action control mode and an intention-
based action mode. Pfister et al. (2011) have shown that previously
acquired action effect associations either impact performance or
not, depending on which of these two modes is operating. One can
of course debate what exactly differentiates the intention-based
from stimulus-based action mode (e.g., Neuringer and Jensen,
2010), however, empirical data highlights that different paths to
action do exist.
While our current study is inspired by recent work on effect-
based action control, we focus on distinguishing between self-
generated vs. cue-induced stimulus expectations. Such a focus
is feasible given that theories on integration of perception and
action (e.g., Hommel, 2009; Magen and Cohen, 2010) suggest that
action effects and stimuli share the same representational basis.
Studying self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations is driven by
the conjecture that anticipating appropriate environmental con-
ditions in order to prepare for efficient goal-directed actions is
one of the core abilities of our neurocognitive system (e.g., Kunde
et al., 2007). Anticipation, prediction, and expectancy are only
some of the labels used to discuss such mechanisms (e.g., Sutton
and Barto, 1981; Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Jentzsch and Sommer,
2002). Here we use the term expectation in a broad sense, encom-
passing both the process of expecting as well as the object of this
process. Expectations can originate from prior experience, when
events occurring with a high frequency in the past are expected
to be more likely to occur again in the future (e.g., Fitts et al.,
1963). Expectations may as well rest upon situational cues that
provide advance information about upcoming events (e.g., Posner
and Snyder, 1975). Whatever the source, performance is usually
boosted when the expected event occurs, whereas unexpected
events impair performance (e.g., Acosta, 1982).
Previous studies of expectation have often exclusively relied
on the use of external cues (e.g., Shulman et al., 1999; Oswal
et al., 2007). Cueing allows a more rigid experimental manip-
ulation of the induced expectations as compared to a setup
with self-generated expectations. However, before jumping to
the conclusion that cueing should be used to study expecta-
tion in general, potential functional differences between endoge-
nous and exogenous expectations should be scrutinized. To our
knowledge, the only direct comparison of self-generated and cue-
induced expectations was carried out by Acosta (1982). In a
series of experiments he pitted predictions verbalized by partici-
pants against cues (words that announced a certain stimulus and
were to be read aloud). As he included neutral expectations as
a control, he could differentiate the facilitation of correct expec-
tations from the cost of a wrong expectation. Furthermore, he
manipulated the expectation-target interval and found effects of
the interval duration in the prediction condition for both bene-
fits of matches and costs of mismatches. Benefits increased with
longer expectation-target intervals while costs were highest at
the shortest intervals. The effects were generally much smaller
in the cue condition. Mismatch costs were also highest at the
shorter intervals while no significant benefits for matches of cue-
induced expectations were found. In a second experiment he
manipulated the number of the response alternatives by map-
ping more than one stimulus to a response. The expectation
effect did not increase linearly with the number of alternative
responses, indicating that the process responsible for expecta-
tion effects is not just a scaling effect in choosing between the
possible alternatives to predict. Moreover, his findings suggested
that expectation effects were bound to stimulus processing rather
than to response processing. As multiple stimuli were mapped to
the same response, an expectation concerning a stimulus could
be violated while the response to be executed was the same
that would have been appropriate in case of a stimulus match-
ing the expectation. Responses in such trials were as slow as
those to unexpected stimuli with a different response. This sug-
gests that the expectation effect is not (solely) a part of response
execution.
Comparing different behavioral effects of self-generated vs.
cue-induced expectation, Acosta (1982) concluded that the types
of expectation differed only in the magnitude of their effects
but not qualitatively. It therefore appears expedient to study self-
generated vs. cue-induced expectations with respect to their effects
on action preparation including neural measures that are more
independent of the overt responses and could better differenti-
ate quantitative from qualitative effects. In the current study we
aimed to replicate the behavioral findings of Acosta (1982), show-
ing stronger effects of self-generated compared to cue-induced
expectations. Moreover, we used event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) to further distinguish the contribution of different cogni-
tive processes to expectation effects in these two conditions. This
includes potential differences between the two types of expec-
tation prior to stimulus presentation. Qualitative differences in
preparatory activity would be in accordance with theories that
assume different routes to action (e.g., Astor-Jack and Haggard,
2005; Kunde et al., 2007; Pfister et al., 2011).
Explicit self-generated expectations about upcoming stimuli
measured on a trial-by-trial basis (through verbalization) have
not been a focus of recent research. To analyze the processes
during the build-up of the expectations and response prepara-
tion, we used EEG recordings. There are two main questions we
wanted to address with this study. First, do differences between
the expectation types already exist prior to stimulus presenta-
tion? Second, which cognitive processes (perception, action selec-
tion, motor preparation) are influenced by expectation? More
specifically, do self-generated expectations affect other processes
than cue-induced expectations (qualitative differences between the
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expectation types) or affect the same processes but with a different
magnitude (quantitative differences)?
We manipulated the type of expectation within-subjects. In
the prediction condition participants had to verbally express their
expectation regarding the upcoming stimulus, in the cue condi-
tion they had to read aloud a word naming the upcoming stimulus.
Stimuli were simple shapes or colors. The task was then to react
as fast as possible to the imperative stimulus with the right or left
index finger. Since there were four stimuli, with two mapped to
each finger, three types of matches or mismatches existed. First,
for stimulus matches the expected (cued or predicted) stimulus
matched the upcoming stimulus. Second, for response matches
the expected stimulus did not match the upcoming stimulus but
required the same response. Third, for mismatches the expected
stimulus and the upcoming stimulus were different and did not
require the same response either.
In addition, we included a manipulation of stimulus frequency.
The two stimuli mapped to each finger were shown with dif-
ferent frequencies, at either 33 or 17% of all trials. Both hands
had to respond equally often. The frequency manipulation was
included to guide the participants’ predictions and to provide a
measure indicating whether participants base their predictions on
their experience (instead of random guessing). In a similar para-
digm, Umbach et al. (2012) have shown that participants closely
match their stimulus predictions to the observed frequencies. Even
though expectations in their study were not valid in predicting the
stimulus (similar to the current study) participants nonetheless
used these expectations in preparing their responses.
The role of expectation in action preparation can be studied by
comparing trials in which upcoming stimuli fulfill vs. do not fulfill
expectations in behavioral measures (RTs and errors, e.g., Acosta,
1982) or with regard to effects in the brain that can for instance
be measured by EEG (e.g., Matt et al., 1992; Jentzsch and Sommer,
2002). There are multiple processes that can lead to the expecta-
tion mismatch effects. It is possible that a correct expectation (a)
facilitates the encoding of the stimulus, (b) the response selection,
(c) response execution, or a combination of these. It is also pos-
sible that an expectation that does not match the stimulus delays
one of these processes, or else that both – fulfilled and unfulfilled
expectations – have opposing effects. Time differences in RTs and
the latencies of the different ERPs which occur during the different
stages prior to the response can help to show the stage(s) where
the expectations exert their influence. ERP amplitudes can provide
information about the magnitude of the involved processes in the
different conditions.
CONTINGENT NEGATIVE VARIATION
To investigate whether there is a difference of cue-induced vs.
self-generated expectation even before the stimulus is shown, we
charted the contingent negative variation (CNV). This is a slow
negative potential following an event cueing the upcoming target
stimulus (inducing expectations in our case). The CNV develops
in the cue-target interval and its amplitude is most pronounced
directly before onset of the imperative stimulus. Depending on
task demands, the late phase of the CNV reflects sensory, cognitive,
or motor preparation (Damen and Brunia, 1994; Fan et al., 2007).
Acosta (1982) has shown stronger RT effects in self-generated as
compared to cue-induced expectations. A possible cause of this
difference may be that the internal generation of expectations
results in a larger amount of specific preparation that could, con-
sequently, show up in a more pronounced CNV in the prediction
condition.
N2
The N2 is an ERP characterized by a larger amplitude in cases
where the stimulus deviates in form or context from the prevail-
ing stimulus (for a review, see Patel and Azzam, 2005). The N2
is also larger in response conflict trials as evoked by incongruent
flanker or no-go trials (Kopp et al., 1996). Therefore, we explored
whether mismatch between either kind of expectation and the
upcoming target would result in an enlarged N2 amplitude. Larger
interference effects in the N2 have been demonstrated in the Erik-
sen flanker task with a greater proportion of incongruent trials
(Tillman and Wiens, 2011). As the interference effect on RTs was
smaller in this condition, the N2 might reflect endogenous atten-
tion processes. If we assume that self-generated expectations have
a stronger influence on preparatory processes (e.g., attention), the
violation of an expectation might result in a larger N2 effect in the
prediction condition compared to the cue condition.
P3
Matt et al. (1992) and Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) differen-
tiated between passive and active forms of expectations. While
passive expectations automatically affect behavior, active expecta-
tions act in a rather controlled manner (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982). Matt and colleagues induced active expectations through
instruction (“Expect stimulus repetitions!”“Expect stimulus alter-
nations!”) in a blockwise manner. P3 amplitude as well as RTs
revealed the higher order repetition effects typically found in
simple reaction time tasks (stimulus repetitions benefit if they
continue a run of repetitions, alternations if they continue a run
of alternations). Importantly, the RT effect but not the P3 effect
was modulated by the instructed expectation (expecting repeti-
tions reduced the sequential effect for repetitions and increased
that for alternations, and vice versa). This dissociation suggests
that active and passive forms of expectation differentially affect
processing stages involved in performing the task but might not
show up in the P3.
However, operationalization of active and passive forms of
expectation differed between Matt et al. (1992) and the current
study. In contrast to their experimental approach, self-generated
expectations in the current study were allowed to change on
a trial-by-trial basis and were induced by stimulus frequency.
Self-generated expectations might lead to stronger P3 effects as
compared to cue-induced effects, because generating expectations
internally trial-by-trial might lead to more pronounced processing
of the expectation as compared to reading a cue. If one considers
the relation of stimulus to expectation (rather than considering
the stimulus alone), there are various possibilities for P3 effects.
On the one hand, it is possible that the P3 relates to expectation by
capitalizing on stimulus probability. In the current design, expec-
tations often mismatch the actual stimuli. Even if a participant
exclusively relies on the frequent stimulus, expectation matches
are rare. Therefore, upon stimulus presentation, a P3 could follow
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in case of matches. On the other hand, P3 may reflect the accu-
racy of a concrete expectation on a single-trial basis rather than
reflecting the past frequency of this expectation being fulfilled. In
this case, a stimulus mismatching the expectation should elicit the
higher P3 amplitude.
LATERALIZED READINESS POTENTIAL
At the other end of the processing stream, the lateralized readiness
potential (LRP) can be used to infer the role of response prepa-
ration in expectation effects (e.g., Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002).
The LRP is a difference waveform that arises with a higher activ-
ity in the motor area of the brain hemisphere contralateral to the
responding hand as compared to the ipsilateral hemisphere (Coles,
1989). The onset of the stimulus-locked LRP (S-LRP) provides a
chronometric index of premotor processing stages (Leuthold et al.,
1996) while onset differences in the response-locked LRP (LRP-R)
indicate processing differences at late motor-related stages (Hack-
ley and Valle-Inclán, 1998). Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) found
that S-LRP was significantly influenced by the expectations, while
the LRP-R was not. This shows that the instructed expectation
influenced a process after early stimulus processing (as P3 was
not affected in this study) but prior to the response initiation.
Accordingly, we assumed expectation effects specifically on the S-
LRP that should be particularly strong in case of self-generated
expectations.
INFLUENCES OF STIMULUS FREQUENCY
While the main focus of our experiment lay on the comparison of
cue-induced vs. self-generated expectations, the variation of stim-
ulus frequency we applied also needs to be briefly summarized.
Obviously the experimenter has little control over expectations
self-generated by participants. By varying stimulus frequency it
should be possible to partly shape self-generated expectations and
to be able to explore how self-generated expectations accommo-
date to the task environment (see Umbach et al., 2012). Specifically,
reliance on stimulus frequency can be considered a sign of subjec-
tive validity of the self-generated expectations that participants are
asked to verbalize. Furthermore, the more frequent stimuli should
lead to faster responses as compared to less frequent stimuli. Poten-
tial effects of stimulus frequency may in part be independent of
expectation match effects in the current trial (compare Jiménez
and Méndez,2012). Conceivably, stimulus frequency leads to a sus-
tained effect more similar to the passive form of expectation that
Matt et al. (1992) found reflected in the P3. We expected larger
P3 and N2 components for infrequent as compared to frequent
stimuli.
Furthermore, the CNV is seen to reflect preparatory processes
and the amplitude is, for example, modulated by cue validity (if
the upcoming stimulus is specified with different probabilities).
CNV amplitude is larger the more valid the cues (and thus, the
more expected the stimuli) are (Scheibe et al., 2009). We therefore
expect a larger CNV for the expectations of frequent stimuli since
these are more likely to be fulfilled (33 vs. 17% validity).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighteen participants (four men) with a mean age of 24.7 years
took part in the experiment. All Participants were right-handed
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The partici-
pants were either psychology students at Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin and participated in exchange for course credit or received
a compensation of C20 for the experiment with a duration
of approximately two and a half hours. Participants gave their
informed consent prior to the experiment.
APPARATUS AND SOFTWARE
The Experiment was programmed with MathWorks MATLAB and
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) and pre-
sented on a Windows computer. The participants’ expectations
were recorded using a table microphone and played to the experi-
menter who coded the predictions on a separate computer outside
the EEG booth. Error feedback after erroneous responses was given
via tabletop speakers.
STIMULUS MATERIAL AND EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION
The stimuli were either simple shapes (house, star, cross, and gate)
or colored circles (blue, red,green,and yellow) presented on a com-
puter monitor with a light gray background. Stimuli were 22 mm
in diameter, corresponding to a visual angle of about 2.1˚ at a view-
ing distance of approximately 60 cm. The experiment consisted
of two parts: a cue-induced (cue condition) and a self-generated
expectation variant (prediction condition). One of these parts was
performed with colors as stimuli and the other with shapes. The
order of the expectation variants as well as the assignment to the
two types of stimuli was randomized across participants.
In trials of the cue condition, the participants were presented
with the one-syllable word for one of the stimuli, which they were
instructed to read aloud (the German equivalents for house, star,
cross, and gate in the shape condition, or the German equivalents
for blue, red, green, and yellow in the color condition). In the pre-
diction condition they saw a prompt – the German equivalent for
“color?” or “shape?” – to which they should respond by naming
the stimulus they expected to appear in the current trial. Thus,
verbal output consisted of the same words in both expectation
conditions.
Participants had to react to the stimuli by pressing one of two
buttons with either the left or the right index finger. Depending
on the current type of stimuli, each button corresponded to two
forms or two colors. The mapping was randomized, shown before
the experiment and was trained during two training blocks. Of
the two stimuli per hand, one was presented in one out of three
trials (33% = frequent stimuli) and the others in one out of six
(17% = infrequent stimuli; half as often as the frequent stimuli),
together resulting in the same frequency (50%) of responses with
each hand. The order in which the stimuli were presented was
randomized. In the cue condition, the frequency of the cues was
matched to the frequency of the stimuli (cues for frequent stimuli
were shown in 33% of the trials, cues for infrequent stimuli in
17%). The task is shown in Figure 1.
TASK PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTIONS
After being introduced to the lab and the experimental procedure,
participants provided their consent to participate and were seated
in a one person lab room and prepared for the EEG measure-
ments. Next a detailed explanation of the task in the following
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FIGURE 1 |Task used in the experiment. On each trial, participants either
had to read aloud the cue (in this case “star”) or to verbalize their prediction
for the upcoming stimulus (in this case “yellow”). After 1,000 ms the fixation
point appeared on screen and after another 1,500 ms the stimulus appeared
on screen (in this case red in the prediction trial, signifying a mismatch, and a
star in the cued trial, signifying a match). The participants manually responded
to the stimulus by pressing one of two keys. The next trial started 500 ms
after the response. The mapping of the stimulus types (shape, color) to the
expectation conditions and the order of the expectation conditions was
balanced over participants.
experiment and the stimulus-response mapping was presented
on the screen and also explained by the experimenter. Instruc-
tions explained the course of the trials, the response mappings
and the request to relax the mouth as soon as possible after
pronouncing the expectation (i.e., as soon as the fixation point
presented in response to the registration of the expectation). This
was included to ensure minimized muscle artifacts in the EEG
measurements.
The first training block of eight trials followed. After that, a
shorter version of the instructions was presented and any ques-
tions that arose during the first training block could be clarified
with the experimenter. This was followed by another training
block, after which the experimenter left the room and the par-
ticipant could start the experiment by pressing a button. The
experiment consisted of two parts, each containing five blocks
of 108 trials. The length of the breaks between the blocks could be
controlled by the participants. The second half of the experiment
contained a switching of the stimuli and expectation condition.
There were again two training blocks of eight trials each preceded
by instructions explaining the new task. To minimize mistakes, the
stimulus-response mapping was shown before every block. If the
wrong button was pressed an acoustic error feedback was given;
it was also given when no button had been pressed within 5 s
following stimulus presentation.
Each trial in the experimental blocks began with the presen-
tation of either the cue or the prompt for the expectation in the
middle of the screen. After 1,000 ms, the fixation point was shown
at the same point. After another 1,500 ms, the stimulus was shown
until a button press was registered or for 5 s if no reaction fol-
lowed during that time. This was followed by an intertrial interval
of 500 ms before the next trial started with the presentation of a
cue or prediction prompt.
At the end of the session participants were asked to estimate
the frequency of the characteristic stimulus values.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS
Recordings were made from Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in an
electrode cap (Easy-Cap) at 25 scalp positions (FP1, FP2, F3, F4,
F7, F8, C3, C4, T7, T8, P3, P4, P7, P8, O7, O8, O1, O2, FPz, Fz,
FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, Oz) according to the extended 10–20 system.
AFz served as ground electrode. In addition, external electrodes
were used for recording the vertical and horizontal electrooculo-
gram as well as for the mastoids. The electrodes were referenced
to the linked mastoids. Electrode impedance was kept below 5 kΩ.
The EEG was recorded with a sampling rate of 1,000 Hz and no
online filters were applied. Blink artifacts were corrected semi-
automatically by independent component analysis (ICA) using the
ICA algorithm integrated in the BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain-
Products GmbH). Offline, the continuous EEG was separated into
individual trials with 300 ms pre- and 2,700 ms post-cue epochs
(cue-locked data, in the prediction condition they were locked
to the presentation of the prompt), and 200 ms pre- and 800 ms
post-stimulus epochs (stimulus-locked data), and with 1,000 ms
pre- and 200 ms post-response epochs (response-locked data).
DATA ANALYSIS
For data analysis, only trials with correct key presses were con-
sidered. For the CNV, the cue-locked segments were averaged
according to the expectation condition (cue vs. prediction) and
frequency condition (expectation corresponded to frequent or
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infrequent stimulus) and 30 Hz low-pass filtered. For the statistical
analysis the difference between the mean voltage around the visual
potential of the fixation point (1,400–1,200 ms prior to stimulus
presentation) and the mean voltage 200 ms before the stimulus
onset at electrode Cz was used with the baseline 200 ms before the
onset of the cue or the prediction prompt. For the N2 and P3, the
stimulus-locked segments were averaged according to the expec-
tation conditions (cue vs. prediction) and match types (mismatch,
response match, and stimulus match) and 30 Hz low-pass filtered
(Butterworth, slope 12 dB/oct). The N2 amplitude was the mean
amplitude measured at Fz between 250 and 350 ms after stimulus
onset. P3 latency was measured as the time of the positive max-
imum at the Pz electrode during the time range of 250–550 ms
following stimulus onset. The P3 amplitude was measured as the
mean amplitude measured at Pz between 250 and 550 ms after
stimulus onset. For both N2 and P3 the baseline was taken during
a 200 ms pre-stimulus interval.
For the LRP, EEG was 5 Hz low-pass filtered (Butterworth, slope
12 dB/oct). The LRP was derived by computing difference waves
for the C3 and the C4 electrodes between the electrode contralat-
eral to the corresponding hand in a given trial and the ipsilateral
electrode. Then the two types of difference waves (C3–C4 for
right-hand response trials and C4–C3 for left-hand response tri-
als) were averaged within each of the experimental conditions
(cue mismatch, cue response match, cue stimulus match, predic-
tion mismatch, prediction response match, prediction stimulus
match). LRP onsets were analyzed using a jackknife-based pro-
cedure for factorial designs (Ulrich and Miller, 2001). Eighteen
different grand average LRPs for each of the experimental condi-
tions were computed by omitting the ERP data of one participant
from each grand average. This allowed to measure the usually
noisy LRP onsets much more precisely than on a single partici-
pant. LRP onsets were measured in the waveform of each grand
average and submitted to an ANOVA with F-values corrected
as F c = F /(n − 1)2, with F c as the corrected F-value and n as
the number of participants. S-LRP onsets were measured with
a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline and LRP-R with a 100 ms base-
line, starting 100 ms after the responses were made. As Miller
et al. (1998) recommended, we used a relative criterion of 50%
of the maximal LRP amplitude during the recording epoch for
determining the LRP onsets for both the S- and the R-locked LRPs.
SPEECH ARTIFACTS AND VERBALIZATION LATENCY
The participants were asked to verbalize their expectation as soon
as the prompt or cue was shown and to relax their facial mus-
cles again as soon as the fixation point was shown. The EEG data
acquired during the time of speech was not analyzed. The earliest
data points used in the analysis were in the Cz amplitude (CNV),
starting 100 ms after the presentation of the fixation point, which
should render enough time for artifacts from muscles involved
in the prior speech production to subside. Visual inspection of
the microphone recordings showed activations in the frequency
range of speech primarily prior to the presentation of the fixa-
tion point. In addition, the stimulus types and their mapping to
the expectation condition and frequencies were randomized; thus
their verbalization should not have been able to systematically
influence any EEG measurements. Furthermore, participants were
instructed to use the relatively long interval between the prompt
or cue and the fixation point for blinking if necessary.
Analyzing processing differences with chronometric measures
(as comparing ERP latencies) presumes equivalent starting points
of the processes of interest. In our case it is assumed that possi-
ble preparatory processes start with the verbalization of either the
prediction or the cue, respectively. Possibly, however, it is harder
to generate a prediction than to read a cue. If, because of this,
predictions are verbalized later than cues that have simply to be
read aloud, preparation, on the one hand, may start later in the
prediction condition and, on the other hand, the distance in time
between the verbalization and the imperative stimulus would be
shorter for predictions than for cues. Both influences would make
a comparison of the time courses of the prediction and cue condi-
tions problematic. Being aware of these difficulties we conducted
a behavioral pilot study with the same materials that allowed a
precise measurement of voice onset times. Moreover, anticipating
possible differences in verbalization latency, we locked the time
of stimulus presentation in this pilot study to voice onset time
rather than using a fixed interval between prompt/cue and stim-
ulus as in the main study reported here. The stricter controlled
pilot study revealed the same behavioral effects of expectation as
the EEG study. Importantly, we found no difference in verbaliza-
tion latency between predictions and cues (though the different
standard deviations may mirror a processing difference between
producing one and the same word as a prediction or by reading)1
and decided for a fixed interval between prompt/cue and stimulus
in the main study in order to avoid problems with incompatibilities
between speech recognition and precise EEG recording.
RESULTS
EXCLUSION OF DATA
Training blocks were not analyzed. Furthermore, error trials were
excluded from the RT and EEG analyses. Trials in which the
participants had not reacted after 5 s were counted as error tri-
als. According to this criterion 2.6% of all trials were excluded.
Response time analyses were based on medians per participant
and condition. Due to the experimental design, roughly twice as
many mismatch trials went into the analysis compared to response
matches and stimulus matches; this proportion was similar for
both expectation conditions2. Predictions were matched by the
correct stimulus in 25.9% of trials while cues were valid in 27.7%.
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Response times and error rates can be seen in Figure 2. RT was on
average 72 ms longer for mismatches than for stimulus matches.
This slowing was about the same for response match and com-
plete mismatch trials. Match trials were also more accurate than
mismatch trials. The advantage of stimulus matches was larger
for the prediction condition (Figure 2, left; 113 ms) than for the
1Voice onset time results from the behavioral pilot study; predictions: M = 467 ms
(SD = 117.03), cues: M = 465 ms (SD = 49.05), t (9) = 0.08, ns.
2Number of trials, excluding errors: predictions: mismatch M = 257 (SD = 13);
response match M = 127 (SD = 11); stimulus match M = 138 (SD = 11); cues:
mismatch M = 268 (SD = 7); response match M = 119 (SD = 5); stimulus match
M = 149 (SD = 4).



























































































mismatch response match smulus match
FIGURE 2 | Response times and error rates. Response times (outer bars)
exhibit an effect of match (with faster responses to stimulus matches than
to response matches and mismatches) and an interaction with expectation
condition (with a stronger effect of match in the self-generated predictions,
left). The same pattern is visible in the error rates (inner bars). There were
less errors made in the match trials, thus the effect in response times
cannot be explained by a speed-accuracy trade-off. Error bars represent
confidence intervals (95%) for repeated-measures designs according to
Loftus and Masson (1994) and Jarmasz and Hollands (2009).
cue condition (Figure 2, right; 31 ms). Additionally, the RTs were
17 ms shorter for the frequent stimuli compared to infrequent
stimuli. A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with expecta-
tion condition, match and frequency as within-subjects factors
on the median RTs rendered a significant main effect of fre-
quency, F(1, 17) = 32.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.66, and of match,
F(2, 34) = 316.38, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.95 ; there was no main effect
of expectation condition, F(1, 17) = 0.06, ns. Importantly, there
was a significant interaction of match and expectation condition,
F(2, 34) = 36.78, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.68 , with a larger difference
between the two types of mismatch and the stimulus match for the
prediction condition than for the cue condition. T -tests revealed
that for both expectation conditions there was no significant dif-
ference between mismatch and response match [both t (17) < 1.46,
ns], while the stimulus match was significantly faster than both [all
t (17) > 6.69, p < 0.001, all d > 3.38]. The effect of match on the
error rates was in the same direction, F(2, 34) = 7.13, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.30 , with less errors for stimulus matches as compared
to mismatches. The effects can therefore not be explained by a
speed-accuracy trade-off.
The frequency manipulation was reflected in the prediction
behavior, as participants predicted the more frequent stimuli on
a larger proportion of trials, χ2(1) = 7.39, p = 0.007. The post hoc
estimates of stimulus occurrence in % made by the participants
also provide a good approximation of the actual frequencies,
with the frequent stimuli at 59%, and the infrequent stimuli at
41% (for comparison, real presentation frequencies: 66 and 33%,
respectively).
CONTINGENT NEGATIVE VARIATION
The CNV was neither influenced by the expectation condition nor
by the frequency. A repeated-measures ANOVA for the influence
of frequency and expectation condition revealed no main effect
of expectation condition, F(1, 17) = 1.29, ns, or of frequency, F(1,
17) = 1.64, ns, and no interaction, F(1, 17) = 0.92, ns.
N2
Figure 3 (top) shows the N2 for the prediction and the cue condi-
tion at electrode Fz. The N2 amplitude was larger for the cue con-
dition than for the prediction condition, and in both expectation
conditions the N2 was larger for mismatches and response matches
than for stimulus matches. The amplitude difference of response
matches and mismatches compared to stimulus matches was larger
for the prediction than for the cue condition. A repeated-measures
ANOVA for the effects of match type and expectation condition
on the mean amplitude of the N2 measured at Fz between 250
and 350 ms revealed a main effect for match, F(2, 34) = 15.52,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48 and a main effect for expectation condition,
F(1, 17) = 39.14, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.70. The interaction was based
on a larger amplitude difference between the different match types
for the prediction condition compared to the cue condition, F(2,
34) = 6.79, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.29. A three-way repeated-measures
ANOVA that also included the influence of frequency on the
N2 peak amplitude rendered no main effect of frequency, F(1,
17) < 0.01, ns.
P3
The P3 (Figure 3, bottom) had a larger amplitude for predictions
compared to cues and for mismatches compared to stimulus and
response matches. In the cue condition the full stimulus match
exhibited the smallest P3 amplitude, with a higher amplitude for
response matches and the highest amplitude for mismatches. In
the prediction condition the pattern was more complex, with stim-
ulus matches showing a much shorter peak latency of the P3
compared to all other conditions. A repeated-measures ANOVA
for the effects of match type and expectation condition on the
mean amplitude of the P3 revealed a main effect for match, F(2,
34) = 14.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.45, a main effect for expectation
condition, F(1, 17) = 16.23, p < 0.001,η2p = 0.49, and a significant
interaction, F(2, 34) = 6.83, p < 0.003, η2p = 0.29. A three-way
repeated-measures ANOVA that also included the influence of
frequency on the P3 mean amplitude rendered no effect of fre-
quency, F(1, 17) = 0.23, ns. There was a significant effect of match
on the peak latency, F(2, 34) = 17.20, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50. A
t -test revealed that this was due to the earlier P3 for stimulus
matches in the prediction condition. The P3 for stimulus matches
in the prediction condition began on average 85 ms earlier than
for mismatches, t (17) = 5.57, p < 0.001, d = 2.70.
LATERALIZED READINESS POTENTIAL
The onset of the S-LRP was earlier for stimulus matches than
for response matches and mismatches, mirroring the RT results
(Figure 4, top). A repeated-measures ANOVA for the influence of
match and expectation condition on the S-LRP onset rendered a
main effect of match, F(2, 34) = 24.33, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.59 , but
not of expectation condition. There was a trend toward an interac-
tion, F(2, 34) = 2.58, p = 0.090, η2p = 0.13, with a larger difference
between the S-LRP onset latency for the stimulus match compared


























































Kemper et al. Self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations
FIGURE 3 | ERPs at midline electrodes Fz, Cz, and Pz time-locked to
stimulus onset. Prediction condition is shown on the left, cue condition on
the right. For each electrode the different waveforms for the three match
types are shown. Analysis windows for N2 and P3 components are
highlighted in gray. Stimulus matches are marked by the solid line, response
matches by the dashed line, and mismatches by the dotted line. The
interaction of match and expectation condition can best be seen at the Fz
electrode for the N2 and at the Pz electrode for the P3.
to the response match and mismatch in the prediction condition
compared to the cue condition.
As can be seen in Figure 4 (top) there was an early rise of
the response match S-LRP (especially in the prediction condition)
which then soon aligned with the mismatch S-LRP. According
to this visual inspection we also analyzed the average S-LRP
amplitude 150–250 ms after stimulus onset. A repeated-measures
ANOVA for the influence of match and expectation condition on
the S-LRP amplitude 150–250 ms after stimulus onset revealed a
main effect of match, F(2, 34) = 19.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53 ,
but not of expectation condition. There was a significant interac-
tion of expectation condition and stimulus match condition, F(2,



































































































































































FIGURE 4 |Top: stimulus-locked LRP waveforms for the prediction
condition (left) and cue condition (right). There was an earlier S-LRP onset
for stimulus matches than for mismatches and response matches. (Onsets
are marked by the short vertical lines intersecting the waveforms.) This onset
difference was, in trend, larger for the prediction condition. Although the
response match S-LRP onset is as late as for mismatches, they differ in their
amplitude before S-LRP onset (50% of the maximum amplitude) in the time
interval 150–250 ms following stimulus onset (highlighted in gray). The
response match amplitude rises in the correct direction as with the stimulus
match and is significantly higher than the mismatch amplitude, but only in the
prediction condition. Bottom: response-locked LRP waveforms for the
prediction condition (left) and cue condition (right). There is only a significant
effect of match with an earlier LRP-R onset for stimulus matches compared to
response matches and mismatches.
34) = 3.92, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.19. The average S-LRP amplitude
in the prediction condition in this interval was 0.29 μV higher for
response matches than for mismatches, t (17) = 2.20, p = 0.042,
d = 1.06 but there was no such difference in the cue condition,
t (17) = 0.65, ns. Even though it was not reflected in the response
time this finding indicates an early correct motoric activation for
response matches in the prediction condition.
The onset latency of the LRP-R was influenced only by match,
F(2, 34) = 5.21, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.24 but not by the expectation
condition; there was no interaction (Figure 4, bottom).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to shed some light on the basic
processes that underlie the effects of expectation on the control
of performance. We were especially interested in distinguishing
between the consequences of self-generated expectations (pre-
dictions) vs. cue-induced expectations. On each trial participants
verbalized an expectation prior to stimulus onset in a two-choice
discrimination task. The expectation was either freely generated
by the participants (prediction) or specified by an external cue (a
word denoting the discriminating stimulus feature). Our results
suggest that when investigating effects of explicit expectation one
should be aware of possible differences between internally and
externally triggered anticipation processes: predictions showed
stronger behavioral effects and stronger effects on most ERP com-
ponents after stimulus presentation that are related to expectation.
The two types of expectation showed different aftereffects once a
matching or mismatching stimulus was presented. Predictions,
therefore, differed substantially from cue-induced expectations.
Direct comparisons of behavioral and neuronal indicators
between expectations induced by cues vs. self-generated expec-
tations have been lacking so far. With respect to behavioral differ-
ences between the two types of expectation we replicated Acosta
(1982). RTs were slower when the stimulus did not match the
expectation as compared to a match. This difference was larger in
the prediction than in the cue condition. Moreover, as in Acosta’s
study, we found no benefit of response match trials over complete
mismatch trials, suggesting that the expectation exerts its influence
before response preparation. The results of error rates reflected
RTs, contradicting a speed-accuracy trade-off. Additionally, as a


























































Kemper et al. Self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations
consequence of the frequency manipulation in our experiment,
participants also responded faster to the more frequent stimuli.
In the following we shall first discuss the relevant aspects of the
ERP results on self-generated vs. cue-induced expectations. We
shall then discuss how type of expectation might relate to similar
distinctions in other aspects of action control.
STRONGER ERP EFFECTS FOR PREDICTIONS VS. CUES
The CNV did not reveal any differences between predictions and
cues. If at all, differences in the cue-target interval between both
conditions showed up in an early time window starting 450 ms
after cue onset. This was, however, the time window compris-
ing the speech artifacts. Furthermore, participants were instructed
that blinks should be synchronized with speaking aloud. Although
the time window of this cue-related positive deflection resembled
those found in task switching paradigms (e.g., Nicholson et al.,
2005; Li et al., 2012) we refrain from further interpretation until
this positivity is replicated in a design excluding artifacts.
In the ERPs related to stimulus processing we found differ-
ences with respect to expectation match that were modulated by
the source of expectation (prediction vs. cue). The N2 ampli-
tude for response match and complete mismatch trials was larger
than for stimulus match trials, and this difference was significantly
larger in the prediction condition. The N2 has been reported to
be larger for incompatibly cued stimuli (Kopp et al., 1996) and
interpreted as reflecting cognitive control functions concerning
incorrect response preparations. Thus, our results might reflect
the need to control the prepared incorrect responses for stimulus
mismatch trials. However, in case of a response match the response
associated with the unexpected stimulus is correct in our experi-
ment. Our finding of equal N2 amplitudes for response match and
complete mismatch trials indicates that the control processes are
triggered by the pure stimulus mismatch. This corresponds to the
view that interprets the N2 as a sign of mismatch or conflict detec-
tion (e.g., Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Nigbur et al., 2011). Our
data suggests that the effect is elicited by the stimulus violating the
expectation rather than by the response associated with a different
stimulus than the one presented.
Expectation effects on the N2 are larger in the prediction con-
dition. As the probability of a violation of the expectation was
comparable for the prediction and the cue conditions it is unlikely
that the match effect in the N2 mirrors just the probability of
conflict. This finding corresponds to the view that preparing for a
self-generated prediction involves endogenous attention processes
to a greater degree as preparing for a cued stimulus. Further-
more, the N2 amplitude was generally higher in the cue condition.
Though this main effect does not relate to our hypotheses, one
might speculate that it possibly also reflects the“expectation mode”
(self-generated vs. externally triggered). Presumably, expectations
were weaker in the cue condition so that stimuli were generally
“less expected” as compared to the prediction condition. This cor-
responds to the smaller expectation effects we found for the cue
condition in the behavioral data and the other ERPs.
We obtained an interaction of match and expectation condi-
tion for the P3 amplitude. While usually higher P3 amplitudes
have been found for infrequent stimuli (Fabiani et al., 1987), we
were able to demonstrate a frequency-independent influence of
subjective expectation on the P3. Our results differ from those
of Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002, who did not find an influence of
explicit expectation on the P3. A possible reason for this discrep-
ancy may lie in methodological differences. In contrast to Jentzsch
and Sommer, 2002; see also Matt et al., 1992), we allowed expecta-
tions to fluctuate on a trial-by-trial basis instead of manipulating
them by instruction at a block-level. Inducing an expectation
at the beginning of a block of trials might lead to a situation
where this expectation is implemented for action preparation
early on and afterward might be effective in action preparation
on lower levels of representation while no longer being strongly
represented as an expectation proper (compare e.g., Wenke et al.,
2009, for a similar argument with respect to the implementation
of instructed stimulus-response links). Furthermore our experi-
mental approach differed from the one in the above studies in that
we required participants to generate explicit expectations them-
selves instead of being asked to hold a specific expectation given
by instructions. As a consequence, the design of the present study
might have been more sensitive to detecting small effects on P3
amplitudes. Concluding from our data, we suggest that explicit
self-generated expectation indeed affects early stimulus processing
stages, even stronger so than cue-induced expectations.
There was a much earlier P3 peak for stimulus matches as
compared to mismatches in the prediction condition. Though the
component was similar in its form to the other experimental con-
ditions, conceivably, some kind of signal of prediction success or
affirmation might have played a role if the self-generated expec-
tation proved to be correct. Usually, the latency of the P3 peak
reflects the time of uncertainty resolution. Sutton et al. (1967)
showed this for match trials in an experiment with explicit self-
generated expectations about upcoming auditory stimuli (either
single or double clicks). They analyzed match trials in which sin-
gle clicks were expected. The P3 latency depended on the latency
of the possible (unexpected) second click. In the conditions with
earlier second clicks the P3 was also earlier because the uncertainty
about whether the expectation matched could be resolved earlier.
This does not explain why in our study the P3 is so much ear-
lier for stimulus matches only in the prediction condition, while
in the cue condition the P3 is as late for stimulus matches as for
mismatches. In the cue condition, uncertainty regarding the cor-
rectness of preparation should be resolved similarly early as in
the prediction condition. However, in accordance with the idea
that self-generated expectations result in more preparation than
cue-induced expectations, a stronger impact of uncertainty reso-
lution in the prediction condition seems plausible. We looked at
the scalp distribution for this component in order to check if there
is an additional process responsible for the latency difference, but
the distribution did not differ from the distributions around the
P3 for the other conditions.
Furthermore, we found no frequency effect for the N2 or P3.
Even though frequency affected RTs, these effects do not seem to
stem from the processes involved in the generation of the N2 or
P3. In contrast to our hypothesis and the results from Jentzsch and
Sommer (2002), the more passive form of expectation generated
by the stimulus frequency had no effect on the ERPs. This could
be due to the relatively small frequency differences of the four
stimuli. As the expectations for the more frequent stimuli in our
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experiment happened to be matched by the stimulus more often
than for the infrequent stimuli, an effect of frequency or an inter-
action of frequency and condition could also have been expected to
influence the CNV. Expectation validity has been shown to affect
CNV amplitude (Scheibe et al., 2009). However, there were no
effects of the frequency manipulation on the CNV in our data,
perhaps due to the relatively small differences in stimulus fre-
quency that resulted in equally small differences in expectation
validity. Although two of the four possible stimuli were shown
twice as often as the other two, the absolute difference in validity
between frequent and infrequent stimuli amounted to only 17%
(as compared to 25% differences and an overall higher validity, 50
vs. 75 and 100%, in Scheibe et al., 2009).
The LRP results only partially reflect our predictions. As
expected, the S-LRP onset reflected the RT results for the different
match types, showing that these effects are the result of premotoric
processing stages. The interaction with the influence of the expec-
tation condition only approached significance. In contrast to our
hypothesis and the results of Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) there
was a significant effect of match type on the LRP-R onset, similar
to the S-LRP onset and the RT, with an earlier onset for stimulus
matches than for the two mismatch types. That is, motor prepara-
tion started earlier in those cases with fast response selection. The
expectation condition, however, did not affect motor preparation
as measured by the LRP-R.
Response matches did not differ from complete mismatches in
behavioral performance. Although response matches call for the
same response as indicated by the cue or prediction, we did not find
any benefit compared to complete mismatches. This finding sug-
gests that response preparation depends on the imperative stim-
ulus. Similarly, the N2 and P3 amplitude did not differ between
response matches and mismatches whereas response matches dif-
fered significantly from stimulus matches in N2 and P3 amplitude
measures. The facilitation of stimulus matches is reflected in the
S-LRP onset and can, therefore, be attributed to perceptual and/or
central parts of the preparation process. There was no difference
between response matches and complete mismatches in the S-LRP
and the LRP-R onset was similarly late for response match and
mismatch. This is partly in line with what the theory of event cod-
ing (TEC; Hommel, 2009) would predict. Event codes are abstract
codes encompassing features of perceived stimuli and (to be) pro-
duced actions. According to TEC, stimulus and response features
are integrated into one event code. Event codes might be formed
and retrieved both during prediction/cue processing and when
the stimulus is presented and responded to (compare e.g., Wenke
et al., 2007). Connecting and disconnecting features in an event
code takes processing time. Thus, if we assume that explicit expec-
tation provides some form of “preparative” event code, response
matches, and complete mismatches should take longer than stim-
ulus matches, in which all links set up by the expectation can be
kept. This prediction is met by our data. However, TEC further pre-
dicts that complete mismatches are faster than response matches
because a new event code is formed instead of disconnecting old
and connecting new features as in the case of a response match
(in a response match trial the predicted response has to be kept,
but in combination with another stimulus). This prediction is
not met because complete mismatches behaviorally do not differ
significantly from response matches, and, in tendency, are rather
slower than response matches.
Overall, S-LRP results mostly reflected behavioral performance.
However, with self-generated predictions, both stimulus and
response matches lead to an initial rise in the S-LRP, indicating
an activation of the corresponding response. In the later course a
faster rise for stimulus matches results in the S-LRP passing the
onset threshold (defined at 50% of the peak amplitude) much
earlier, while response matches do not pass this threshold before
mismatches. This pattern suggests a preactivation of the correct
response that was then inhibited due to the reevaluation after a
different stimulus was shown. Presumably, inhibition seems to
commence in response matches as soon as the mismatch between
expected and presented stimulus is detected. This is interesting
with regard to the role of stimuli in goal-directed action that Kunde
et al. (2007) offer. They suggest that actions are generally goal-
oriented and stimuli primarily serve to disambiguate between two
variants: (1) a specific effect can be expected to follow an action
in the current context, or (2) a goal is likely unattainable in the
current context. Even simple actions such as button presses or
operations of switches can have different effects depending on
context factors. Presumably, the early S-LRP in response matches
is indicating that action preparation, turning the expectation into
an action goal, is no longer fostered (or even inhibited) once the
stimulus signals a mismatch with the expectation.
DIFFERENTIATING TYPES OF EXPECTATION
We suggest that it is necessary to differentiate between self-
generated and cue-induced expectations. This might be infor-
mative for research proposing similar distinctions with respect
to other aspects of action control. For instance, in research on
effect-based action control the role of action mode (free choice vs.
stimulus-driven) in the acquisition (e.g., Herwig et al., 2007; Her-
wig and Waszak, 2012; Janczyk et al., 2012) or application (Pfister
et al., 2011; Gaschler and Nattkemper, submitted) of action effect
associations is under current debate. We suggest that effect antici-
pation might have an especially strong impact on action control if
it is based on expectations about effects that stem from goals of the
actor rather than being directly caused by current external stim-
ulation. Expectations that are generated internally by integrating
goals and past external stimulation might be represented more
strongly as compared to cue-induced expectations, as the former
need to be shielded against competing external stimulation (com-
pare e.g., Dreisbach and Haider, 2008). When relying on cues that
are present on each trial, a strong representation is not established
as it is not necessary (compare e.g., Ballard et al., 1995).
We explain our results by a difference between self-generated
and cue-induced expectations. A reviewer suggested an alternative
account according to which the response time and ERP differences
might be based on just one kind of expectation that plays out dif-
ferently in these two experimental conditions. For instance, one
could assume that the participant’s expectation is in most cases
validly reflected in the prediction condition. Thus, in most trials
the participant would be expecting exactly what she or he verbally
indicates. In contrast, a randomly presented cue might mirror the
expectation on just some of the trials. While the cue suggests the
expectation of a specific stimulus, the participant might not always
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follow this suggestion and often expect a different stimulus instead.
By this account, expectation effects in the cueing condition might
be as strong as in the prediction condition for the subset of trials in
which participants expect what the cue suggests. It would be even
conceivable that in this subset of trials of the cueing condition
expectation effects might be stronger than those of the prediction
condition, as potentially cues and internally generated predictions
could be combined. However, as there is possibly a substantial
proportion of trials in which participants do not follow the cue,
one could expect that effects are on average smaller in the cue-
ing condition as compared to the prediction condition. Though
our experiment was not designed to test this alternative account,
we analyzed reaction time data to evaluate this idea. According to
the above view there should be no (or even a reversed) difference
between the cueing and the prediction condition in the subset of
trials in which there was likely a match between cue and internally
generated expectation. This should be the case for the fastest 10%
of match trials in the cueing condition. Percentile analyses did
not support this conjecture. The 10% fastest match trials in the
cue condition were slower than the 10% fastest match trials in the
prediction condition [Δ = 27.39 ms; t (17) = 2.77, p = 0.013].
A second possibility to address this concern is to scrutinize the
influence of stimulus lag on the match effect in the cue condition.
A typical fallacy often underlying predictions is the tendency to
increasingly expect a stimulus alternation after longer runs of rep-
etitions, also known as the “gambler’s fallacy” (Ayton and Fischer,
2004). If a cue-independent internally generated expectation is
effective in the cueing condition, a stimulus should be increasingly
expected the longer it has not been presented. Indeed, in our sam-
ple the mean prediction probability for a stimulus increased from
16% when it had been presented two trials before to 30% when the
last presentation was five or more trials back. The probability to
predict a first-order repetition was on average 25%. All contrasts
between the prediction probabilities for a stimulus presented at
lag 1 (repetition prediction) to lag 5 or more were statistically sig-
nificant. So, the predictions of our participants seem to reflect a
mixture of a “gambler’s fallacy”-like alternation bias and a first-
order repetition bias. Therefore, if the cue matches a stimulus that
has not been presented for several trials, the likelihood for the cue
matching the “real” expectation should be highest. Consequently,
one would expect the largest match effect at the longest lag of tri-
als. We reanalyzed RTs of stimulus match and complete mismatch
trials (there were not enough data points in some cells for response
matches) of the cue condition. We found an effect for match, F(1,
17) = 38.75, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.70, with no differences between
lags [interaction match × lag: F(1, 17) = 1.43, p = 0.232], while
RTs generally increase over lags for match and mismatch trials
(main effect of lag: F(1, 17) = 8.88, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34). In the
case of a stimulus repetition the effect tended to be larger (41 ms),
rather than smaller, compared to the effect at longer lags (22, 20, 25,
and 20 ms, for lags 2, 3, 4, and more than 4, respectively). Currently,
our data does not support the view that there is only one kind of
expectation effective in both the cueing and prediction condition.
Rather, the data suggests that expectation in the cueing condition
is different from expectation in the prediction condition. As these
post hoc analyses provide only preliminary arguments, the task
to disentangle the interactions between internal and externally
motivated expectation remains open to future research.
One can further argue that self-generated expectations can not
be controlled experimentally to the same extent as cue-induced
expectations. Yet we suggest that it is warranted to (also) use
self-generated expectations for studying effects of expectation on
goal-directed action. Research on task switching has witnessed a
similar case where presumably external validity and experimental
control have to be balanced. It could be shown that a voluntarily
initiated task choice results in different behavioral effects as com-
pared with the situation where the task set to be implemented is
triggered by a cue: voluntary task switches lead to much smaller
task switching costs than cued task switches (Arrington and Logan,
2005). Thus, not only in the preparation of simple actions but also
at the superordinate level of task sets there are differences between
self-initiated and externally triggered processes. Participants in the
Arrington and Logan (2005) study were instructed to choose freely
between two possible tasks (with about the same frequency and
in an approximately random manner). Thus, they decided on a
task to prepare for, or, to put it differently, they expected to exe-
cute the chosen task as soon as the stimulus appeared (cf. Kunde
et al., 2007). Accordingly, after being cued, they prepared to exe-
cute the task given by the cue. This situation, therefore, is similar
to the approach of the current study: performance differences are
observed as a consequence of preparation determined by inter-
nal or external sources. However, it is not clear if the differences
are based on qualitative differences between internally or exter-
nally initiated task preparation processes, or if it may already be
the source of expectation generation (i.e., before any preparation
starts) that affects the consecutive task processes.
The findings from voluntary task switching suggest that the
two paths to action might already differ prior to stimulus presen-
tation. Accordingly, expectations prior to stimulus presentation
may vary and differently affect action preparation depending on
whether they are cue-induced or self-generated. Moreover, the
idea of stimulus-based and intention-based action control modes
(e.g., Herwig et al., 2007) can be mapped to what is (not) nec-
essary to build-up explicit stimulus expectations in cueing vs.
self-generation: while cues can potentially act as rather automatic
triggers for a specific expectation (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand,
1999), the requirement to generate predictions can only be fulfilled
intentionally (compare e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 2006). As expecta-
tions are a part of the action it seems plausible that participants
are more likely to be in an intention-based mode if they generate
expectations themselves. Moreover, expected or unexpected stim-
uli in this context represent feedback (i.e., action effects) to the
expectations, and the contingency between expectations and stim-
uli should impact performance to a larger extent if it is acquired in
an intention-based mode (Pfister et al., 2011). This could explain
the performance differences between prediction and cue trials in
Acosta’s (1982) and our study.
The difference between self-generated and cue-induced expec-
tations and their role in action control requires further study. We
have demonstrated that these types of expectation differ in a situ-
ation in which both are explicitly verbalized using the same words
as output (naming the predicted differentiating stimulus feature
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vs. reading the cue word of this feature). A study trying to gen-
eralize the different expectation effects beyond this specific verbal
task seems promising. Furthermore, it is necessary to test accounts
of how and why self-generated and cue-induced expectations dif-
fer. As of yet, it is not clear whether the two types of expectation
differ qualitatively or quantitatively. Self-generated expectations
might either show stronger and/or qualitatively different effects
on action preparation and performance. For instance, one could
argue that a difference in the results might simply be due to an
artifact in the methods used to induce the two types of expecta-
tion. On the one hand, reading aloud the cues does not enforce
deep processing. In an implicit sequence learning study with a
repeating sequence of to be read words, Hartman et al. (1989)
demonstrated a surprising lack of explicit and even implicit learn-
ing. Generating the predictions, on the other hand, might enforce
deeper processing for various reasons. For instance, participants
were instructed that expectations should not be the same all the
time. The experimenter was present outside the EEG booth cod-
ing the expectations online. Thus, the self-generated expectations
were constrained such that they should be somewhat variable
from trial-to-trial, avoiding perseverance and obvious patterns.
This likely enforced that participants allocated a substantial part
of their resources to the expectations in the prediction version of
the task (compare e.g., Rapoport and Budescu, 1997).
Looking for functional differences between different types of
expectation, Bubic et al. (2009, 2010) employed EEG and fMRI to
investigate involved brain structures and processes. Violations of
sequential regularities were accompanied by increased activity in
premotor and cerebellar components of the“sequencing network,”
presumably reflecting a mismatch between expectations generated
by a forward model (cf. Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) and the
observed stimuli – and an adjustment of the model. In addition,
lateral prefrontal areas were engaged when a sequence violation
required a boost in cognitive control. Stimuli deviating from a
context of standard stimuli by a certain feature (as in an odd-
ball paradigm), on the other hand, triggered responses in bilateral
posterior temporal and parietal areas, reflecting increased atten-
tion and perceptual processing (Bubic et al., 2009). Interestingly,
they also report differences in both the N2 and P3 components
between their expectation conditions. While the N2 exhibited
a shorter latency for sequential deviants compared to feature
deviants, the P3 peaked later in the first condition and had a
smaller amplitude. In line with the activation pattern reported
in their imaging study, both components had a more posterior
distribution for feature deviants. Additionally, they identified an
enhanced N1 component for feature deviants, suggesting an early
sensory registration of the irregularity (Bubic et al., 2010). The
authors take these findings as indication for distinct functional
networks involved in the processing of different types of expecta-
tion. It remains an interesting question whether similar functional
differences also apply to the distinction between self-generated
and externally cued expectation studied here.
CONCLUSION
Self-generated expectations differ from cue-induced expectations
on a range of cognitive processing stages and result in stronger
behavioral effects. Response time benefits for expected stimuli
are much larger when expectations are self-generated as com-
pared to externally cued. Higher amplitudes in both the N2 and
P3 components for violations of self-generated expectations indi-
cate increased premotoric preparation compared to cue-induced
expectations. This goes along with a missing benefit for stimuli
matching the expected response only and is mirrored in the LRP.
Underlying cognitive or neuronal functional differences between
these types of expectation remain a subject for future studies.
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Alternating between different tasks typically results in impaired performance compared 
to repeating the same task. The ubiquity of task switch costs has led to the assumption that 
people are generally unable to fully prepare for a change in tasks, even when it is to be 
expected. To assess the influence of expectations on task switching performance, we had 
participants self-generating verbal task predictions. In a second condition, participants had to 
read aloud word-cues indicating the upcoming task. Performance effects were related to 
expectation: a correctly predicted task switch entailed no switch costs (50% switch 
probability) or even reversed switch costs (80% switch probability). Self-generated 
expectations enabled task-set preparation to a higher degree than cue-induced expectations. 
When relying on their subjective expectation, people are able to overcome the commonly 
found reluctance to switch tasks and fully prepare for an upcoming change. To understand 
task-switching performance, it’s not enough to look at the current (or recent) stimulation. It is 
important to account for internal subjective expectation as well. 
Keywords: Task switching, switch-unspecific preparation, proactive processes, self-





In the early evening of May 8, 2009, 24-year-old Aiden Quinn was driving his Green 
Line trolley through downtown Boston, exchanging text messages with his girlfriend at the 
same time. While looking down on his cellphone, “he noticed red lights, looked up, attempted 
to apply the brake, and it was too late,” as the chief of the Boston area’s transit authority, 
Daniel Grabauskas, told the press later 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/us/10boston.html). Quinn’s train crashed into another 
trolley that was stopped at a red signal, injuring 49 passengers. This example is just one of 
countless accidents caused by people trying to focus on more than one task at a time.  
Psychologists have known for long that we are notoriously bad at multitasking, or 
switching from one task to another, taking more time in doing so and making more errors 
compared to sticking with just one task (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 1927; 
see Kiesel et al., 2010, for a recent review). While such “switch costs” may not carry as 
severe consequences in the lab as, say, on the road, task-switching experiments have provided 
many insights into this phenomenon. Impaired performance for task alternations has been 
reported even when tasks were presented in predictable sequences (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 
1995), when they were validly cued (e.g., Meiran, 1996), or when participants were able to 
choose between tasks voluntarily (e.g., Arrington & Logan, 2004). This has led researchers to 
suggest a “structural inability to fully prepare for a task switch” (Kiesel et al., 2010, p. 855). 
The idea that we cannot (fully) prepare for an expected change (cf. Duthoo et al., 2012) 
seems to contradict the notion of the “proactive brain” (Bar, 2009a) that has gained a lot of 
support recently (see Bar, 2011, for a recent collection). The above cited paradigms were 
constructed in ways that could enable participants to form reliable expectations about the 
upcoming task. In single-task paradigms, expectations regarding the upcoming trial have 




generation of predictions is one of the “universal principles that can explain the majority of 
[the brains] operation” (Bar, 2009b, p. 1181), the apparent lack of preparation for expected 
switches calls for further investigation. The aim of this study is to analyze the role of 
expectation in task switching. 
The consistent finding of performance differences between task repetitions and 
alternations has led to a variety of theoretical explanations that can be grouped into two 
opposing views: a reactive and a proactive account of task switching. According to the 
reactive account, control adjustments necessary to overcome a conflict between alternating 
tasks are implemented in response to a target (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001). Switch costs are 
often thought to stem from the involvement of additional processes in a task switch (such as 
“task-set reconfiguration”) that are not required in task repetitions. These switch-specific 
processes are further divided into two stages: the first can be completed in advance, allowing 
for a partial preparation benefit for expected switches, while the second stage relies on the 
presentation of the stimulus. Such two-stage models therefore explain “residual switch costs” 
with the necessarily incomplete preparation (e.g., Roger & Monsell, 1995). Apart from 
influences of cognitive control, benefits of repetitions over switches could be explained by 
passive carry-over effects: in terms of priming effects of the previous task in case of 
repetitions, or in terms of interference from the previous task in case of switches. According 
to a purely reactive view, expectations regarding the sequence of tasks therefore should play 
no role for task switching. Switching costs would be determined mainly by the relation of the 
current task to the task in the preceding trial. 
A proactive account, however, would assume anticipatory control adjustments, or 
preparation based on expectation (see Umbach et al., 2012). Support for a proactive view on 
task switching stems from a wide range of studies revealing reduced switch costs if the task is 




with various tasks and experimental designs (cf. Kiesel et al., 2010) and proven to be present 
independently of carry-over effects from the previous task (e.g. Meiran, 1996). A reduction in 
switch costs with a longer preparatory interval was also found if the participants chose 
themselves when to repeat and when to switch tasks (Arrington & Logan, 2004). This 
evidence demonstrates than we can do at least a part of the switch before the target if we have 
the possibility to anticipate the upcoming task, either by being informed externally or by 
choosing it ourselves. As performance improvements by valid precueing are present in 
repetition trials as well (e.g. Monsell & Mizon, 2006), some studies failed to find a reduction 
in switch costs because the response times shortened to the same extent for task repetition 
and task switch trials (e.g. Altmann, 2004). Similarly, performance on task switch as well as 
on repetition trials has been shown to be better if the sequence of tasks is fixed (i.e., 
predictable) as compared to if it is randomly cued, resulting in similar costs for a task switch 
in both conditions (Koch, 2005). Advance preparation, thus, appears to be not switch specific 
but to relate to the upcoming task, regardless of switch or repetition.  
There is some evidence in the literature hinting to a role of subjective task expectation 
in the emergence and extent of switch costs. Mayr (2006) found smaller costs in a four-cues-
two-tasks-paradigm if the proportion of task switches was high. He concluded that 
participants under conditions of high switch probability prepare for a switch rather than for a 
repetition (see also Dreisbach & Haider, 2006). Higher costs for a cue switch in combination 
with a task repetition under these circumstances support this conclusion. Expectation effects 
were considered more directly in a study of Dreisbach, Haider and Kluwe (2002). They 
suggested a mixture of an activation advantage of the repeated task (automatic carry-over 
effects or task-set adaptation) and preparation according to (cued) task expectations. Using 
cues that announced one of four tasks with a certain probability (from .25 to 1) they could 




probabilities (i.e., more valid precues). A constant switch cost for tasks cued with the same 
probability suggests that the activation advantage of a repeated task set influences task 
switching performance independently of expectation. Clearly, preparation effects in cueing 
paradigms could be caused by reactive processes in response to the cue. Cue switching costs 
(e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 2003) are a stable finding that supports this 
view. Probably, cueing effects are a mixture of priming and expectation effects and, thus, 
somewhat problematic if one wants to investigate the role of expectation on preparation for a 
task. 
A recent study by Duthoo and colleagues (2012) probed the proactive account by 
looking at the impact of self-generated predictions in task switching. In a typical 
magnitude/parity task-switching paradigm, they asked participants to predict the upcoming 
task on every trial. Between subjects, the probability of task alternations varied from 30% 
over 50% to 70%.  They found the highest performance following correct repetition 
predictions, while a false repetition prediction (that was actually followed by a task 
alternation) impeded performance the most. There were no performance differences between 
task repetitions and alternations following an alternation prediction. The authors therefore 
concluded that switch costs only arise in conjunction with repetition predictions. This finding 
is in line with the repetition benefit view of task switching. Importantly, participants in their 
study heavily overestimated the proportion of repetitions, indicating a repetition bias (in all 
three conditions). While also partly in line with a proactive account of task switching, the 
study by Duthoo and colleagues (2012) leaves open the question “to what extent our brain 
can also prepare for expected changes” (p. 8). In their study, preparation for alternations was 
always incomplete, leaving a residual cost (correctly predicted repetitions were faster than 




preparation for repetitions and alternations. If people expect a change, and expectation leads 
to preparation, they should be able to prepare for that change. 
A potential methodological issue in the Duthoo et al. (2012) study lies in the use of 
manual predictions and responses with the same hand. This could have resulted in hand 
priming and might therefore have artefactually increased the reported repetition benefit. For 
example, a participant presses a key with his left hand to indicate that he expects the 
magnitude task on a given trial. If the task following that prediction is indeed the magnitude 
task, the participant has to use his left hand again to respond to it. As he has just used that 
hand before, the response might come faster as if he had to use his other hand to respond to 
the parity task. Therefore, task switch performance might have additionally suffered from the 
necessary switch in hands. This potential confound can be eliminated by the use of verbal 
predictions in place of manual ones. The verbalization of the to-be-performed task has been 
shown to improve task-switching performance, while pronouncing task-irrelevant words 
impaired performance (Goschke, 2000). This is in line with the idea that inner speech 
facilitates action control (Luria, 1969). In a single-task paradigm, verbalized expectations 
have been shown to exert a larger influence on action preparation compared to non-
verbalized internal expectations or external cues (Umbach et al., 2012). 
As we were interested specifically in proactive influences on task switching 
performance, we also included a comparison between self-generated and exogenously 
triggered expectations in their impact on subsequent processing. Recently, a study from our 
lab (Kemper et al., 2012) demonstrated that self-generated expectations differ from cue-
induced expectations on a range of processing stages and result in stronger behavioral effects 
(Kemper et al., 2012). Increased premotoric preparation for self-generated predictions was 
indicated by higher amplitudes in the N2 and P3 components. LRP results were also in line 




procedures to induce expectations, as these are seemingly easier to control. However, 
internally generating expectations themselves might not only come closer to what people do 
outside the laboratory, but also involve different cognitive mechanisms and result in different 
behavioral outcomes. As this is true for simple stimulus expectations (Kemper et al., 2012), 
it’s informative to look at the same comparison in relation to task expectations. 
In the current study, we wanted to challenge the assumption that people cannot fully 
prepare for an expected task alternation (cf. Duthoo et al., 2012). In the spirit of the 
“proactive brain”, we hypothesize that (1) people are able to prepare for a correctly predicted 
task alternation if the situation makes it reasonable for them to strongly rely on their 
predictions (i.e., when their chances of scoring a correct prediction are above average). 
Therefore, we also included a condition with 80% task alternations, increasing the likelihood 
of scoring a correct alternation prediction. In contrast to the conclusion by Duthoo and 
colleagues (2012), we assume the prediction effect in task switching does not rely exclusively 
on repetition predictions. Also, we wanted to see whether this effect also hold for verbal 
(instead of manual) predictions. This would rule out alternative explanations of motoric 
priming. In line with the verbal mediation effects on task-switching performance cited above, 
we hypothesize that (2) verbalizing tasks will improve performance and reduce switch costs 
when the prediction is correct - and impair performance in case of an incorrect prediction. 
Finally, we wanted to check whether the difference between self-generated and cue-induced 
expectations found in single-task paradigms also holds for a task-switching paradigm. We 
hypothesize that (3) the effect of self-generated predictions on task-switching performance is 









42 participants (26 women, aged 19 to 35 years) took part in individual sessions lasting 
approximately 60 minutes, receiving either partial course credit (for psychology students) or 
a monetary compensation of 8 euros. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and were native German speakers. Two participants were left-handed. 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was presented on a Windows computer with a 17-inch CRT monitor 
and controlled by a MATLAB script with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
1997). Stimuli were colored circles presented in two shades of blue (RGB values 0, 0, 255 
and 30, 144, 255) and two sizes (1.3 and 2.6 cm, corresponding to visual angles of about 1.5 
and 3 degrees at a viewing distance of approximately 50 cm) on a light grey background 
above or below a black horizontal midline. Verbal responses (cues, predictions) were 
recorded using a headset microphone to obtain voice onset times; self-generated predictions 
were simultaneously coded by the experimenter sitting next to the participant on a separate 
computer. Target responses were made on a standard Windows keyboard using the index and 
middle fingers of both hands. Acoustic error feedback was given via headphones after 
erroneous responses. 
Design and procedure 
Participants were either confronted with an equal amount of task repetitions and 
alternations (50%, medium switch probability) or with an increased proportion of alternations 
(80%, high switch probability) in a between-subjects design. Each experimental session 
consisted of two parts, a cue-induced (cue condition) and a self-generated expectation variant 
(prediction condition), establishing expectation source as a within-subjects factor. The order 




that had to be categorized by either color shade (light/dark) or size (big/small, see details 
above). Targets were presented above or below a horizontal midline, indicating which task to 
perform in the current trial (color/size). All target combinations had the same presentation 
frequency with a randomized order of appearance. Also, the two tasks were presented 
randomly at equal probabilities. 
At the beginning of each trial participants had to verbalize an expectation regarding the 
upcoming task. They either read aloud the word “Farbe” or “Größe” (German for color and 
size, respectively) displayed on the screen in the cue condition, or they self-generated one of 
these words in response to a prompt (question mark) in the prediction condition. (Both 
cue/prediction words were two-syllable nouns, reducing lexical variability.) Cues had the 
same frequency as tasks and were independently randomized, therefore correctly indicating 
the upcoming task on half the trials in the medium switch probability condition (50% 
validity). In the high switch probability condition, cues predicted a switch on 80% of all trials 
(mirroring the actual switch probability), leading to a validity of 68%. It was explained in the 
instruction that cue words hinted at the upcoming task and could be either valid or not. In the 
prediction condition, participants were instructed to guess the upcoming task themselves. 
These predictions were then manually coded by the experimenter, who was present in the lab 
room throughout. 
The cue or prediction prompt (and the subsequent verbalization) was followed after 
2,500 ms by the target stimulus (described above). Participants had to respond by pressing 
one of two buttons with either the index or the middle finger of the hand corresponding to the 
current task. Left and right hand were mapped to the color and size task, and this response 
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. The next trial started 500 ms after a button 




Two training blocks of 10 trials each preceded four regular blocks of 88 (medium 
switch probability) or 80 trials (high switch probability) in each expectation condition 
(cue/prediction). Successive presentation of task repetitions and switches was controlled to 
resemble a pattern expected by chance, following a method described by Jiménez & Méndez 
(2013; see also Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006; Nicks, 1959). For each block 
and task we included two runs of four trials, four runs of three trials, eight runs of two trials, 
and eight runs of one trial, adding up to 88 trials in the medium switch probability condition. 
In the high switch probability condition we included two runs of three trials, four runs of two 
trials, and 26 runs of one trial for each task and block, adding up to 80 trials. These runs were 
then randomly arranged for each block and participant, with the constraint that a given run 
could not be followed by another run of the same task. 
Results 
One participant was excluded from the analysis because of a technical error with data 
collection. Another participant was excluded for predicting the same task on every trial 
throughout the experiment. Three more participants were excluded for producing too many 
errors (more than 2 SD above the mean of all participants). The analysis was carried out on 
the remaining 37 participants (18 in the medium switch probability and 19 in the high switch 
probability condition). We did not include the first trial of each block and removed error trials 
from the RT analysis (6%). RT outliers (± 2.5 SD, calculated separately per group, subject, 
condition, and task) were also removed (2.3%), leaving 90.5% of the complete data for the 
analysis. 
A mixed-design ANOVA on RT with the between-subjects factor Switch Probability 
(medium vs. high) and the within-subjects factors Condition (cue vs. prediction), Task (color 
vs. size) and Sequence (repetition vs. alternation) revealed only a main effect of Task, F(1, 




and a significant interaction between Sequence and Switch Probability, F(1, 35) = 27.77, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .44, implying that switch costs were affected by the probability manipulation. 
There were no main effects for Switch Probability, F(1, 35) = 1.28, ns, or Condition, F(1, 35) 
< 1, ns, and, importantly, no main effect for Sequence, F(1, 35) = 2.62, p = .115, indicating 
that there were no overall switch costs, at least in this analysis. No other interactions turned 
out significant. A follow-up paired samples t-test revealed significant task switching costs (79 
ms) for the medium switch probability group, t(17) = 7.14, p < .001, and reversed switching 
costs (-41 ms) for high switch probability group, t(18) = -2.12, p = .048 (multiple comparison 
correction according to the Holm-Bonferroni method; Holm, 1979). 
Looking into the prediction patterns, we found that in both groups the color task was 
predicted in 51% of all trials on average (SD = 3%), indicating that participants followed the 
instructions, correctly reproduced the equal task probabilities and were not biased towards 
one task. In the high switch probability group there were more alternation predictions (60%) 
than in the medium switch probability group (45%), t(35) = 2.79, p = .008. Participants 
therefore adapted their predictions to the given switch probabilities. While there was no 
repetition bias in the medium switch probability group (55% predicted vs. 50% actual 
repetitions), t(17) = 1.53, p = .146, participants in the high switch probability group 
manifested a repetition bias (40% predicted vs. 20% actual repetitions), t(18) = 4.69, p < 
.001. The overall validity of predictions was at 51% correct in the medium switch probability 
group and 57% in the high switch probability group, while cue validity varied from 46% in 
the medium to 67% in the high switch probability group. Mean verbalization latency in both 
groups was at 354 ms for predictions (SD = 244 ms) and 335 ms for cues (SD = 152 ms). 
The effects of predictions (and cues) on task-switching performance were tested in a 
mixed-design ANOVA on RT with the between-subjects factor Switch Probability and the 




this analysis (see Figure 1), the main effect of Sequence became significant, F(1, 35) = 24.84, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .42, hinting at the importance of taking expectations into account when 
looking at task-switching costs. This is underlined by the main effect of Expectation, F(1, 35) 
= 7.38, p = .010, ηp2 = .17. There were again no differences between groups (Switch 
Probability, F(1, 35) = 1.4, ns) and sources of expectation (Condition, F(1, 35) < 1, ns). As in 
the above analysis, the interaction between Sequence and Switch Probability, F(1, 35) = 
26.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, reflected the difference in switch costs between the probability 
groups. A significant interaction between Sequence and Expectation, F(1, 35) = 73.45, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .68, confirmed the influence of expectations on task-switching costs. Finally, this 
effect of expectation on switch costs differed between predictions and cues, as manifested in 
a three-way interaction between Condition,Sequence and Expectation, F(1, 35) = 9.57, p = 
.004, ηp2 = .22. No other interactions became significant (all F < 1). A follow-up paired 
samples t-test revealed that in the medium switch probability group, switch costs were only 
present following repetition predictions or cues (144 ms), t(17) = 9.32, p < .001, but 
disappeared following alternation predictions or cues (1 ms), t(17) < 1, ns. In the high switch 
probability group, switch costs following repetition predictions or cues (78 ms), t(18) = 7.00, 
p < .001, were reversed following alternation predictions ot cues (-83 ms), t(18) = -3.77, p = 
.001. Also, there were no residual switch costs in the high switch probability group (correctly 
predicted alternations vs. correctly predicted repetitions), t(18) < 1, ns. 
An analysis of the error rates in a mixed-design ANOVA with the between-subjects 
factor Switch Probability and the within-subjects factors Condition, Sequence and 
Expectation revealed main effects for Switch Probability, F(1, 35) = 4.89, p = .034, and 
Condition, F(1, 35) = 4.54, p = .040, as well as two-way interaction between Sequence and 
Expectation, F(1, 35) = 11.56, p = .002, and a four-way interaction Probability x Condition x 





The aim of this study was to analyze the role of expectations in preparing for repeating 
or alternating tasks. In a task-switching paradigm, participants had to either judge the size or 
color of circles, with the current task indicated by the screen position of the circle. Task 
expectation was either induced by explicit word cues (that had to be read aloud) or self-
generated by participants through verbal predictions. One group of participants was 
confronted with an equal amount of task repetitions and alternations (medium switch 
probability), while for another group tasks alternated on 80% of trials (high switch 
probability). Switch costs were affected by the probability manipulation, with impaired 
performance on alternation trials in the medium switch probability group and improved 
performance (switch benefit) in the high switch probability group. This effect was apparently 
mediated by expectation: following an alternation expectation, there were no switch costs in 
the medium switch probability group, and reversed switch costs in the high switch probability 
group. In line with this reasoning, participants adapted their predictions to the given switch 
probabilities, with more alternation predictions in the high switch probability group. There 
were no residual switch costs (between correctly predicted alternations and correctly 
predicted repetitions) in the high switch probability group. The expectation effect on 
performance was stronger for predictions than for cues. 
Proactive task switching 
Our  hypothesis that (1) people are able to prepare for a correctly predicted task 
alternation was confirmed. With correct predictions, switch costs were reduced or even 
reversed (in the high switch probability group). We could also show that this effect does not 
rely exclusively on repetition predictions. As there was no difference between correctly 
predicted alternations and correctly predicted repetitions in the high switch probability group, 




the situation makes it reasonable for them to strongly rely on their predictions. The lack of 
residual switch costs in our study makes it unnecessary to assume any additional switch-
specific process. This is consistent with the repetition-benefit view, assuming similar 
preparatory processes in switch and repeat trials. This repetition benefit can at least partly be 
traced back to expectation-based preparatory processes, as participants were overestimating 
the amount of repetitions in the high switch probability group. The lack of such a repetition 
bias in the medium switch probability group, however, points to the additional influence of 
automatic carry-over effects from the previous trial. More important yet is the finding of 
similar performance for correctly predicted alternations and repetitions (in the high switch 
probability group). This speaks in favor of a truly proactive account of task-switching.  
Recently, Duthoo and colleagues (2012) also looked at the impact of self-generated 
predictions on task-switching performance. While replicating their main finding that task 
preparation is influenced by expectation, a few important differences emerge between their 
study and ours. While Duthoo and colleagues (2012) reported a consistent repetition bias 
across all switch probabilities ranging from 30% to 70%, participants in our study only 
overestimated the amount of repetitions in the high switch probability condition (80%), but 
not in the medium switch probability condition (50%). This divergent finding raises the 
questions whether (a) the repetition bias is as stable across procedures as Duthoo et al. (2012) 
assume, and whether (b) the repetition benefit found in most task-switching studies can be 
traced back to such a repetition bias, as the authors argue. In fact, people are prone to a 
variety of biases when judging the probability of events. As Ayton & Fischer (2004) have 
shown, such biases can arise from real-life experience and often lead to adaptive behavior. 
When observing a series of events where the outcome is determined by human performance 
(such as consecutive shots taken by a basketball player), people tend to assume a positive 




on the other hand, tend to invoke a negative recency expectation (“gambler’s fallacy”). In a 
recent study from our lab (Umbach et al., 2012), we found that people are able to adapt their 
predictions fairly quickly to the actual probabilities experienced in a task. This kind of 
bevavioral adaptation has also been described as probability matching (e.g. Gaissmaier & 
Schooler, 2008). Taken together with the results of the current study, these findings suggest 
that there is no universal repetition bias in task predictions that can be obtained in all 
experimental procedures and conditions. The reasoning by Duthoo et al. (2012) that typical 
task-switching performance can largely be explained by this bias must therefore be 
questioned. In our medium switch probability condition, participants achieved a repetition 
benefit without displaying any repetition bias in their predictions. Besides subjective 
expectation, there might have been an additional influence of automatic carry-over effects 
from the previous trial, leading to the observed repetition benefit. The impact of subjective 
expectation might be particularly strong when people have learned to rely on it, as it was 
possible in the high switch probability condition. When prediction hit rate was at chance level 
(as in the medium switch probability condition), participants might have relied less on their 
subjective expectation and allowed for a stronger influence of automatic priming processes. 
In the high switch probability group in our study, there were no performance 
differences between correctly predicted repetitions and correctly predicted alternations. We 
therefore did not find the residual switch costs reported by Dutoo et al. (2012). The 
expectation effect on task-switching performance reported here did not rely on repetition 
predictions only. Participants in our study were able to prepare for predicted alternations, too. 
This even resulted in reversed switch costs, with an expected task switch taking less time than 
an unexpected task repetition. Preparation and performance were clearly linked to subjective 




contradicts the idea that we cannot fully prepare for a task switch (cf. Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Duthoo et al., 2012). 
Switch-unspecific preparation 
In contrast to the conclusion suggested by Duthoo et al. (2012) our results demonstrate 
that the expectation effect on task-switching performance does not rely exclusively on 
repetition predictions. Rather, people are able to prepare for a correctly predicted task 
alternation if the situation makes it reasonable for them to strongly rely on their predictions. 
This goes along with findings showing switch-unspecific preparation effects in task 
switching. These results correspond to other findings reported in the literature.  
In a study by Dreisbach and colleagues (2002) expectancy for task repetitions and 
alternations was manipulated by probability cues. Participants had to perform one of four 
tasks on each trial. Prior to the task stimulus, a cue announced the probability for a task 
repetition or a switch to one of the other three tasks. Probability rates were 1.00, .75, .50, or 
.25. The authors found equal preparation effects for task repetitions and switches. Switch 
costs did not vary between probability conditions. These findings suggest that preparation is 
not switch-specific but rather an additive factor to the actual switching process. The authors 
argue that if expectations are not explicitly manipulated, participants might implicitly 
overestimate the number of task repetitions as these are easier to perform, leading to the 
commonly found disadvantage for switch trials. As the repetition advantage was not 
influenced by expectancy-driven preparation in their study, the results support the view of an 
automatic carry-over effect leading to a repetition benefit. 
To further examine dynamic preparatory adjustments during task switching, Dreisbach 
and Haider (2006) conducted an experiment in which they manipulated task frequency as 
well as expectancy type. Participants had to perform either a magnitude or a parity judgment 




manipulated between blocks (75% vs. 25% switches). The current frequency was either 
announced once before the block started (global expectancy condition) or repeatedly 
indicated before every trial (local expectancy condition). The authors found stronger overall 
preparation effects leading to reduced switch costs in high shift blocks compared to high 
repetition blocks. Furthermore, while RTs in the local expectancy condition were affected by 
task frequency, there were no RT differences between probable and improbable task shifts in 
the global expectancy condition. Also, no switch costs occurred in the 75% shift block in the 
local condition. These findings support the assumption of preparatory adjustments to current 
task demands. When faced with higher task demands such as frequent task shifting, 
participants put more effort in preparation, thereby reducing switch costs. These preparatory 
adjustments do not need explicit cues but can already be triggered by global probability 
information. However, local expectancy seems to facilitate backward inhibition of 
improbable repetitions more than global expectancy, extinguishing switch costs. 
In an attempt to separate true task switch costs from mere cue switch costs in the cuing 
paradigm several studies were conducted using a 4:2 mapping between cues and tasks. 
Results, however, were contradictory, with some studies showing substantial task switch 
costs (e.g. Mayr & Kliegl, 2003) while others report none or only small task switch costs (e.g. 
Logan & Bundesen, 2003). Along with differences in the experimental procedures in terms of 
switch probability, these inconsistent results have led to an ongoing debate as to the existence 
and nature of true task switch costs, i.e. the difference in RTs between cue-switch and task-
switch transitions. 
On the one hand, the “task-level adaption” account suggests a probability-based 
adaption of task set configuration activities. According to this view, high task switch 
probability can reduce switch costs because subjects adapt to frequent switching and thus 




consider cue switches when deciding whether to prepare for a task switch or a task repetition. 
Thus, high task switch probability increases the conditional probability of a task switch given 
a cue switch, leading to a reduction of true task switch costs but an increase of cue switch 
costs. 
On the other hand, the cue-priming account states that throughout the experiment 
subjects learn specific cue-cue transitions. Hence, reduced switch costs in case of a high task 
switch probability are not due to a general adaption to frequent switching.  Rather, with high 
task switch probability those cue-cue transitions that go along with a task alternation appear 
more often, resulting in a priming advantage due to their frequency. 
To distinguish between those two accounts, Mayr (2006) conducted a study in which he 
manipulated the probability of specific cue transitions. Results support the “task-level 
adaption” account. No significant differences between the two sets of switch-trial transitions 
could be found. Apparently, manipulating the probability of specific cue-cue transitions does 
not affect switch costs. Cue switch costs were larger for the high-probability group, while 
task switch costs were larger for the low-probability group, indicating that switch probability 
affects switch costs independently of specific cue transitions. Moreover, these findings hint at 
the importance of conditional task switch probabilities, which in turn influence expectations. 
Taken together, these findings hint at the influence of subjective task expectations when 
switching back and forth between different tasks. The effects of expectation remain visible 
when controlling for effects of task repetition or (passive) priming. Expectation is switch-
unspecific in that it enables preparation not only for repetitions (cf. Duthoo et al., 2012), but 
also for task alternations. 
Verbal mediation in task switching  
We confirmed the hypothesis that (2) verbalizing tasks will improve performance and 




verbalized predictions. As pointed out above, verbal mediation has been shown to benefit 
task switching performance. Verbalizing task relevant words enables preparation for that 
task. At the same time, we eliminated a possible confound in the Duthoo et al. (2012) study. 
As participants in their study used the same hand to indicate their prediction and to respond to 
that task, they might have profited from hand priming in case of a correct prediction. The 
reported prediction benefit therefore might have been at least in part due to automatic motoric 
priming effects. As we found a clear advantage for correctly predicted tasks without manual 
predictions, we can rule out this possible confound. The effect of self-generated predictions 
on task-switching performance reported in the current study and also by Duthoo et al. (2012) 
cannot be explained by automatic motor priming effects.  
Our finding that the verbalization of task descriptions can improve performance and 
reduce switch costs goes along with findings on verbal mediation in task switching. For 
example, a study by Miyake and colleagues (2004) looked at the role of inner speech in task 
switching. Participants in their study were asked to either name the upcoming task as 
triggered by a cue or perform an articulatory suppression (by pronouncing unrelated words). 
Cues were either complete task names or their initial letters only. Results showed no 
reduction in switch costs for the word cue condition compared to the articulatory suppression 
at a long cue-stimulus interval (1,200 ms). However, in the letter cue condition, articulatory 
suppression led to significantly larger switch cost.  
These findings suggest that the negative impact of articulatory suppression on switch 
cost depends on the cue type. With explicit word cues that automatically activate a 
representation of the task goal, inner speech as retrieval aid might not be necessary, making 
concurrent articulatory suppression less harmful. With less explicit cues, such as the initial 




those cues into task names and activating the correct task set, leading to less efficient mental 
set shifting when interfered by concurrent irrelevant articulation. 
A related finding comes from Logan and Schneider (2006), who found congruency 
effects between task cues and stimuli only with transparent (word) cues but not with 
nontransparent (letter) cues. Similar to Myiake et al. (2004) the authors argue that transparent 
word cues (naming the upcoming task) facilitate task set retrieval and work as mediators for 
the appropriate response. 
Kirkham, Breeze & Marí-Beffa (2012) investigated potential benefits of task-relevant 
verbalizations in an alternating runs paradigm. Participants in their study were asked to read 
aloud a descriptive word cue indicating the upcoming task (shape or color distinction on 
bivalent stimuli). This procedure enabled faster responses compared to a silent reading and an 
articulatory suppression condition. While reading aloud reduced mixing costs (calculated as 
the difference between trials in a pure repeat block and repeat trials in a mixed block of 
trials), there was no influence on switch costs (difference between repeat and switch trials in 
a mixed block). In a second experiment, the authors found that presenting auditory cues (in 
addition to visual cues) had similar effects compared to reading aloud the verbal cues; both 
resulted in reduced response times as well as reduced mixing costs and switch costs 
(compared to silent reading). These findings demonstrate that task-relevant verbalizations 
clearly benefit preparation processes. Even when participants are not required to speak aloud, 
they might use subvocal strategies to achieve similar results. The participants in the Kirkham 
et al. (2012) study all indicated in a post-experiment questionnaire that they had engaged in 
inner speech during the silent reading condition. The additional articulatory and auditory 
processes in the reading aloud condition provided an additional boost. As there was mainly 
an impact on mixing costs and not on switching costs, the authors argue that verbalizations 




The word-cue conditions used by Miyake et al. (2004) and Kirkham et al. (2012) can be 
compared to our cueing condition. Pronouncing a correct cue resulted in faster response times 
compared to a false cue, but this effect was much larger for self-generated predictions (with 
no differences in the verbalization procedure). Presumably, inner speech is involved to a 
greater degree in the generation of predictions than in reading aloud task cues. The switch-
unspecific preparation effects discussed before cannot be explained solely by our 
verbalization procedure, but rather stem from the requirement to engage in proactive task 
prediction. 
Self-generated predictions  
Relating to our third hypothesis, we could demonstrate that the effect of self-generated 
predictions on task-switching performance is stronger than that of cue-induced expectations. 
In addition to self-generated predictions, we also looked at the impact of external cues, 
comparing their effects in a within-subjects design. We thereby expanded the study by 
Duthoo et al. (2012) and were able to distinguish the internal aspect from the verbal aspect in 
predictions. As noted before, verbalizing itself can lead to improved performance, in single-
task as well as in task-switching paradigms. When reading aloud word cues presented on 
screen, participants can benefit from the additional articulatory process as well as the auditory 
input (Kirkham et al., 2012). By keeping these processes equal between both expectation 
conditions in our study, we were able to pinpoint the genuine influence of internally 
generated expectation. The effects of self-generated predictions reported here are therefore 
not due to artifacts of our verbalization procedure. When taken together with the results by 
Duthoo et al. (2012), we can argue that the impact of self-generated predictions is not limited 
to a specific experimental procedure. It can be obtained by manual predictions as well as 




A stronger effect of self-generated predictions on task-switching performance compared 
to cue-induced expectations is in line with studies on internal vs. external sources of 
preparation. Arrington and Logan (2004) demonstrated that even if participants themselves 
decide when to repeat or switch tasks, alternations take longer than repetitions. At a long 
response-stimulus interval (1,000 ms) however switch costs were smaller than at a short 
interval (100 ms). The authors describe their findings “more compatible with active than with 
passive processes” (Arrington & Logan, 2004, p. 614). As these processes, such as the 
decision about which task to perform and the subsequent reconfiguration (cf. Logan & 
Gordon, 2001), need some time, preparation is more complete at the long interval.  
In an attempt to investigate type-specific effects of foreknowledge on task switching 
Kleinsorge & Gajewski (2008) examined task performance based on externally presented 
versus internally generated information and additionally varied the reliability of 
foreknowledge. They found equal switch costs for externally induced and internally 
generated expectations when foreknowledge was reliable (although RTs for externally based 
foreknowledge were numerically smaller) but faster RTs for internally generated expectations 
when foreknowledge was unreliable. These findings suggest that at least with unreliable 
foreknowledge internally based expectations lead to more efficient task preparation than 
externally based foreknowledge.  However, since this design used only short sequences, it 
might be possible that participants in the cue condition additionally learned the task order 
implicitly and thus profited from extra-cuing when foreknowledge was reliable but had more 
difficulties when order and pre-cue announced the wrong task. 
Stronger effects on preparation of self-generated compared to cue-induced expectations 
were also found in a recent study at our lab (Kemper et al., 2012) in a simple two-choice task. 
Similar to the present study, participants were asked to either freely generate a prediction or 




in faster responses than correct cues, they also differed substantially on several ERP 
components. We found a larger mismatch-related negativity for predictions in the N2 
component, suggesting that preparing for a self-generated prediction involves endogenous 
attention processes to a greater degree as preparing for a cued stimulus. We were also able to 
demonstrate a frequency-independent influence of subjective expectation on the P3 
component, with an earlier peak for correctly predicted stimuli, indicating a speeded 
uncertainty resolution compared to the cueing condition. As there were no differences 
between expectation types in the lateralized readiness potentional (LRP), the influence of 
subjective expectation seems to be located in premotoric processing stages. 
Conclusion 
Subjective expectation plays a central role in our behavior by affecting a range of 
preparatory processes (cf. Umbach et al., 2012; Kemper et al., 2012). When researching 
expectation effects on behavior, it is important to allow participants to form their own 
expectations. Subjective expectation can be based on experienced frequency information in 
the task at hand (cf. Umbach et al., 2012). It can also be biased by previous experience in 
other environments (cf. Ayton & Fischer, 2004). Expectations triggered by external cues do 
not carry the same impact on premotoric preparatory processes and behavioral output as self-
generated expectations (cf. Kemper et al., 2012). This is true not only for expectations 
regarding single-task stimuli (Umbach et al., 2012; Kemper et al., 2012), but also for task-
switching paradigms. Self-generated expectations enable task-set preparation to a higher 
degree than cue-induced expectations, as the current results show. When relying on their 
subjective expectation, people are able to overcome the commonly found reluctance to switch 
tasks and prepare for every possibility alike. Had the young trolley driver in the example 
cited in the introduction expected a red light, could he have possibly been prepared to brake 




suggest that people can prepare for (sudden) changes when they’re within their expectations. 
To understand task-switching performance, it’s not enough to look at the current (or recent) 
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Figure 1. Mean response times (in milliseconds) for task alternations (dashed line) and task 
repetitions (solid line) following repetition and alternation cues (left) or predictions (right), 
separately for medium (50%, top) and high switch probability (80%, bottom). Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008; 
Baguley, 2012). 
